Friday, 3 July 2026

Desperate bluffing by Putin

This post will come replete with major caveats in due course, but let's start with the headline.  Vladimir Putin is bluffing like crazy over the inevitability of his victory, and will continue doing so for the next three months (until after the upcoming "elections") against the seemingly slender hope that Trump will somehow ride to his rescue and force Ukraine to accept something that can be portrayed as "victory" for RussiaGiven that use of nukes is off the table, bluffing plus outright airborne slaughter in Kyiv are practically all he has left.

To sum up:

  • the Russian 2026 "spring-summer offensive" has yielded miniscule net[1] territorial gains at the cost of phenomenal Russian casualties.  All objectives remain unmet.
  • counting from the front line to St Petersburg and beyond, the Ukrainian medium- and deep-strike campaign, notably on oil and logistics assets, has: seriously incommoded Russian forces at the front (supplies must be brought up by drone and on foot); paralysed transport on major roads in the occupied territories, with critical shortages of fuel - & water - in Donetsk, and Crimea almost under siege; made significant dents in manufacturing facilities of the Russian industrial-military complex across a very wide swathe of the country; seriously hampered telecomms and air movements across western Russia; wreaked colossal damage on the oil industry, with severe shortages resulting (and forcing large-scale imports from Belarus, India and other nations) that must soon have significant inflationary, industrial and food-production consequences; via vast palls of black smoke over Moscow and St Petersburg, demonstrated vividly and demeaningly to the populace that nowhere is safe from highly accurate drone and missile bombardment.
  • having thus far failed miserably in the planned effort to censor the internet in Chinese style, Putin faces a populace that can see all this quite clearly.  Not withstanding the existence of some loyalist diehards that will cling to Putin's infallibility as they did to Stalin's, the greater part of the people, realistic cynics as most Russians are, have clocked it all as being at the very least, not at all what they were sold back in 2022, but in fact starting to impinge on them directly.  To call this "unrest" would be to misunderstand how Russia has always been: but it's a near equivalent.
  • the economy is in a bad way, and short term relief from Iran-war oil prices has been overtaken by those prices falling back again PLUS the abovementioned actual shortage of oil products.
There are very big decisions pending for after those elections, in two categories:

  1. the economy: if nothing changes, really deep measures will be needed;
  2. manpower: if Putin decides to soldier on, even just to the extent of trying to capture the rest of the Donbass (and his stated territorial goals extend a lot further than that), he'll need a very large intake of new conscripts - perhaps a million.

So: given that's all 3 months away, during which time Putin doubtless feels he can (just about) maintain a facade of BAU, he sees little downside to giving the Trump card one last play.  Look, we're advancing on all fronts - let me lend you this magnifying glass - and can carry on like this forever!  Get that clown to surrender, now - and cash in your Nobel Prize voucher!!  Yeah, right.  Even Witless-Dumkopf, even Trump himself, have probably spotted the flaws in that line of reasoning.

One other thing, before the caveats.  L'il Volodya also shows signs of losing it a bit.  It's always necessary to enter notes of caution here because he's been written off as a dying man for years.  But in a very high-profile set-piece "interview" he gave recently, he dropped a real Biden of a clanger and declared Ukrainian troops in a town deep inside Russia were only 2 km away from being totally surrounded.  He was obviously mistaking it for some tiny Ukrainian settlement he'd been briefed about but forgotten the name of - commentators have made various guesses because it's not entirely obvious which.  But this in the full glare of prime time Russian TV.  Not a helpful incident.

And the caveats?  It's basically the usual one, with a specific twist.  It's always wise to assume that there is no limit to the suffering that can be imposed on the Russian people, however cynical they may be.  That's one manifestation of "the mysterious Russian soul"[2] that they are so proud of.  And I doubt there are any moral limits to the extent Putin is willing to exploit that, even if there might be some political constraints in an internet age.  So my opening list of how bad things are in Russia needs to be considered in that light.  BUT it cuts both ways: Ukrainians are equally able to take it, as they've proved heroically for over four years in defiance of almost all expectations.  Are they crumbling in the next 3 months?  No, they ain't.  And of course they have the tremendous backstop of EU / UK funding, without which it would have all been up for them some while ago.

The special twist is this: all the evidence points to Putin not knowing in detail what's actually happening.  He uses neither mobile phone nor laptop.  The military accounts he receives are just the icing on the mighty traditional Russian layer-cake of filing "beautiful reports" at every stage along the chain; and we can probably assume the economic and industrial reports he gets are similarly sugared.  It's only occasionally that hard facts seem to get through to him.  This all makes it even more likely that he'll play the game of attrition by infinite suffering.  Scary stuff.

There is one last fallback for Putin - China: because we all assume Xi won't let him "actually lose the war".  But Xi also serves as a restraining influence: he's ruled out nukes in no uncertain terms; and note how the 2024 experiment using 10,000 North Korean troops in front-line roles quietly came to an end without being scaled up, or even just continued. 

And "actually losing the war" may not be a relevant criterion: look how badly things have become for Putin with China notionally having his back!  I don't think he'll be getting any change from the Donald either just now: a(nother) failed "peace process" is the last thing Trump needs before the mid-terms.  

ND

________________

[1] 'Net', because Ukraine has been successfully counter-attacking on a couple of fronts and re-seized territory of its own.

[2] Here's some more of my attempts to illuminate these big cultural differences. 

19 comments:

  1. dearieme12:30 pm

    Fifteen years ago I'd have said that Putin may be a murderous KGB thug but at least he seems to be intelligent, realistic, cautious.

    Seems I was wrong, or that he has changed, or both.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Bill Quango1:23 pm

    Perun covered the state of play at the weekend.

    His YouTube’s are an hour. But worth putting on, even in the background, to get an overview.

    It is very interesting how both sides have adapted to the reality of the war. Single men pushing a single cart of supplies up to the drone depot. Because a single man isn’t worth the effort of a drone grenade. Mostly.

    The clever Russian infiltration tactics in 2s and 3s of men until a few platoons are built up across the lines and in the enemy rear. Countered by the Ukrainian holdfast orders. Don’t retreat. Don’t fall back. It’s just a few Russian guys.we’ll cut them off ourselves.

    Perun agrees with ND. Putin is being given all the glorious reports he could wish. One more push. One more summer. One more heave. One more missile attack on Kiev and “ the whole rotten edifice collapses.”

    Serious manpower shortage unless proper conscription is enabled.
    Serious economic pain ongoing and inflationary crisis incoming.

    ReplyDelete
  3. Bill Quango1:24 pm

    The link https://youtu.be/KXnDxQHu_7w?si=oRYjy820MGghiden

    ReplyDelete
  4. Anonymous11:58 pm

    So, eventually Russia is forced into a climb down. Very good for the EU/UK who can say they saw off evil Mr Putin even after the US lost interest. Can they then replace the Ukrainian men that are required to rebuild the country? Not losing is not the same as winning...

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  5. Anonymous12:31 am

    Problem for Putin, and those passing the sugared reports, is that reality inevitably reasserts itself,

    How long can Russia afford importing petrol? Costs are somewhat subsidized, so the state is paying twice over.

    At some point it's going to come down to stopping the war, or Russia facing a collapse. Maybe China isn't bothered about Russia losing? Give Xi a chance to settle some old accounts on China's behalf.

    CH

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  6. Anonymous6:50 am

    Desperate bluffing and sugared reports? That sounds more like this analysis. Running out of men? Remind me which side has thugs grabbing people off the street to throw into the meat grinder? Or adds kerosene to their drones to make theatrical plumes of smoke? Or bans political parties and elections? That would be The Ukraine, not Russia.

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  7. Anonymous8:20 am

    The trolls are back! Adding kerosene? Coo, what desperation. PS, go take a look at the mega-plumes of smoke above Moscow and St P, and tell me thats all kero packed into the nose of a drone.

    Another explanation might be, the kero was already on the ground in large tanks, just waiting for the spark. "From falling debris", of course.

    Kero in drones striking non-oil targets would actually be quite cute (if theres any spare space in the warhead!). A bit of extra flame makes an electricity substation or a factory burn a bit longer. And notice how many ordinary Russians just love to post footage of the explosions in their towns. A double whammy: more burn and better viral photo-ops for the locals and all their followers!

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  8. Anon 8:20 - @ viral photo-ops for the locals:

    That bears elaboration: something that drives Moscow and its milbloggers crazy is the lack of what they call "information hygiene", i.e. the readiness of Russians to post pix and vids of Ukrainian strikes. Which they contrast bitterly with the extremely good "info hygiene" discipline in Ukraine - and that's not down to some devilish western censorship, because the very occasional Ukrainian footage does go online, and stays there.

    One amazing thing is that in many instances the Russian locals' footage is shot from apartments etc that can be identified really easily - not just the block, but the exact window. With identifiable voices in the background. Against strict injunctions not to do so!

    Yup, the Mysterious Russian Soul incorporates considerable, even reckless contempt for the authorities

    ReplyDelete
  9. CIive2:38 pm

    At the risk of broadening out the discussion on what already quite a big canvas, I’m going to chalk this up as another example of the “Dutch disease” or hydrocarbon curse.

    Russia, Venezuela (remember them? gone quiet now but fits into what looks if you squint enough like a US strategic pattern) and Iran all have energy as a shared resilience mechanism: Vast hydrocarbon reserves and revenues act as a “war chest” or stabiliser. They fund militaries/governments/pay off elites, absorb sanctions or disruptions (via price spikes or rerouting), and buy time for adaptation or negotiation. None of the three has collapsed despite heavy pressure — energy income prevents “losing” outright.

    But… but… but..

    … all the oil in the world still leaves you with limited offensive power. Energy wealth hasn’t enabled quick “wins.” Venezuela’s reserves didn’t deter US action or restore full sovereignty. Iran’s Hormuz leverage inflicted pain but didn’t prevent leadership losses through decapitation or force total US withdrawal (the US can still blockade Iran and there’s not much Iran can do about it, certainly not enough to stop the US and force a retreat). Russia’s exports sustain the war but haven’t overcome Ukrainian deep strikes or delivered battlefield dominance.

    Without the oil, all three countries would have collapsed long ago. Unfortunately without a collapse, they are zombified. They can’t go back, can’t go forward.

    I can see all these conflicts and instabilities persisting for a long, long time. No, it’s not good, really. But no, I don’t know what the answer is, either.

    ReplyDelete
  10. @ Anon 11:58 pm

    The Ukrainians can follow the same playbook as the EU/UK - import large numbers of male engineers from places like Somalia, Sudan, Pakistan etc.
    I'm sure their womenfolk will welcome them the same way Care4Calais do.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Anonymous9:53 pm

      It has to be said it was hard to distinguish between the England side and the DR Congo side. Certainly the Iranians looked a lot whiter than England.

      Delete
  11. Anonymous9:51 pm

    "note how the 2024 experiment using 10,000 North Korean troops in front-line roles quietly came to an end"

    Weren't they for "defensive purposes only" ? My understanding is there are no longer any Ukrainian troops on (pre conflict) Russian territory.

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    Replies
    1. Clive7:02 am

      Independent assessments, including from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) via Russia Matters reports, indicate that Ukraine’s foothold across the Kursk and Belgorod regions has stabilised at roughly 4 square miles in recent weeks (unchanged from June 9–16 through June 23–30, 2026) — https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-ukraine-war-report-card/russia-ukraine-war-report-card-july-1-2026

      I’m skeptical about all so called milblogging and territorial reports in the conflict so you pays your money and takes your choice.

      Maybe someone just told Putin this was true and that was enough? Who knows?

      Delete
  12. Anonymous12:45 pm

    "Independent assessments, including from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW)"

    LOL. Neocon outfit run by the Kagans, advisors to US forces in Iraq and Aghanistan ...

    ReplyDelete
  13. Clive1:05 pm

    As opposed to what, exactly? Russian sympathiser milbloggers? Russian MoFA announcements? Not exactly the last word in trustworthiness are they?

    There’s little in the way of robust and provable information (and my point was that we shouldn’t expect so). What we can do though with some accuracy and traceability is look at how the Russian message design has shifted over time.

    Timescales have lengthened and become more elastic. Earlier messaging often carried stronger expectations of relatively rapid or decisive progress once certain thresholds were crossed. In the July 2026, the framing shifts toward “systematic,” “gradual,” and cumulative gains. Kremlin statement explicitly describes the buffer zone as something “being created, and it is being created systematically.” Gains such as Konstantinovka are presented as important steps in an ongoing process rather than triggers for immediate broader collapse.

    Expectations of sudden or dramatic breakthroughs are managed downwards. Costs (especially Russian costs) are now acknowledged — but framed as absorbable. Ukrainian-inflicted damage is acknowledged more openly — but actively minimised and reframed.

    You weren’t making the sorts of comments you’re making now four and a bit years ago — they were long on certainties, one-sided inevitabilities and gave no indication Russia was kicking the can into a decade-long slog.

    Making a change — but never openly acknowledging you’ve made a change — is a classic Russian info-war cornerstone, which is where Nick’s post came in, I suppose…


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    Replies
    1. Anonymous8:20 pm

      "a classic Russian info-war cornerstone"

      LOL. It's a long way from the front to my overheated garden...and they've reduced the water pressure which makes the wife's myriad pots and raised beds a real time-consuming pain ...

      Delete
    2. Ah. There is it. I was wondering when we might see it. The neutrality pivot.

      I could watch all day when BBC shows clips of Russia correspondent Steve Rosenberg interviewing people he bumps into on the street in vox pops.

      Steve will start by asking a question on what they think of whatever the issue of the day is, the interviewee will respond with the officially approved answer or a version of it.

      Then Steve tries to elicit some deeper analysis by suggesting, perhaps, where reality might not quite reflect what the official version of reality is currently laying out.

      At which point (and to return to the original post’s observations) the man or woman on the street will instantly — without any reaction, hesitation or any clue whatsoever that anything has happened — respond with a “Oh, I’m just a housewife buying my vegetables at the market, I’m not aware of such things, I leave that to the government who know about this” (or similar, as their situation at the time of the interview dictates).

      What always strikes me as really remarkable is that if I were to try to pull this stunt, I’d have a moment of hesitation, something would give it away in my face or flash behind my eyes. It just would not work.

      But for our Russian friends being interviewed — and our anonymous contributor here — it’s like that scene in The Matrix where the entire parameters of our perceptions are reset, everything shimmies for a split second and suddenly we’re in a completely different reality.

      Just some ordinary chap, watering his plants. That’s all there is to see here. That’s all there ever was to see. You never saw anything else. Because there was never anything else to see.

      Delete
  14. Konstantinovka promises to be a bit of a test case. We know that Kupyansk was "fully under Russian control" some time last autumn, as has been announced and re-announced periodically ever since. Except it wasn't, and still isn't.

    Now Konstantinovka has conveniently been captured the day before Putin was due to speak to Trump, and with that NATO summit upcoming. Well well well. Let's suspend judgement for a bit.

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    Replies
    1. Anonymous8:23 pm

      Suspending judgement? This is the Web!

      Delete