An odd barb sometimes thrown in this blog's direction (from who-knows-what troll factory) is that since Russia's invasion of Ukraine four years ago (four!) we have been predicting the imminent collapse of Russia itself. Well, we haven't. Ever. In fact, right from the start we have said that ultimately there's nothing to stop Putin taking Ukraine if he really wants to - which, if anything, was far too generous to L'il Volodya and his ramshackle army. Further, we've always remarked that the Russian capacity for enduring privation and general suffering should never be underestimated.
But it is beginning to look as though Putin's stamina is waning. There are so many straws in the wind: in no particular order -
- the 'victory' parade, hugely-reduced in scale and betraying obvious fears for its security, to the point where Putin could be humiliated (the word used by Russian milbloggers) by Zelenskyy's gracious 'permission' to go ahead with the parade
- widespread and debilitating fuel shortages, courtesy of Ukraine's remarkable drone campaign ...
- ... which, incidentally, has - yet again - blithely crossed one of Russia's stated nuclear red lines in terms of its scale ("the massive launch / take-off of aerospace attack weapons ... and their crossing of the state border of the Russian Federation")
- Russia's re-engagement with US negotiators, with the usual risible sabre-rattling
- the background PR planning for a sudden 'declaration of victory' - even based on today's status quo, if necessary
- serious domestic discontent at frequent blocking of the www and the (supposedly) imminent closure of access to Telegram, all in the name of 'security'
- internal dismay at the Hungarian election result, adding to keenly-felt impotence over Syria / Cuba / Venezuela
- serious economic issues, macro and micro - see below
- angst over the pitiful battlefield performance thus far in 2026 - zero net progress** in the spring/summer offensive campaign (intended to capture the remaining Donbass territory by autumn: Kkarkiv, Kherson and Odessa are rarely mentioned these days); casualty rates exceeding enlistments; and Ukraine has achieved, at least for now, superiority in the 'battlefield air interdiction' (BAI) stakes, courtesy of its swarms of very smart drones and their equally smart deployment in Russia's immediate rear, over and above the deeper oil refinery campaign
- etc etc: I could go on.
Even so, I still don't reckon on near-term "collapse", or defenestration of Putin. He has plenty of tools to prevent either. But I do say he's now beginning to think seriously in terms of an off-ramp: and many powerful people in Russia are even more seriously trying to get this to the top of the agenda.
In the midst of it all, the IISS has published this sober analysis. It doesn't predict imminent collapse either; but it does set out the genuine problems and major dilemma Putin faces. Between now and Xmas, I'm guessing we'll see recognisable, tangible movement taking place - in one direction or another.
ND
________________
** Ukraine has in fact started making systematic small-scale territorial (re)gains all over the front, which in recent weeks have been larger than Russia's own small territorial gains. On both sides these are to be understood in context: they are trivial in extent - largely infiltration sorties - and essentially opportunist in nature. But there's a big difference: Russia's are intended, and indeed celebrated, as purposeful steps towards the taking of the Donbass; i.e. they are meant to be strategic. Ukraine's, by contrast, are tactical spoiling measures - highly disruptive for any coherent Russian offensive this year. But if they do indeed have that effect, they add up to having an important strategic consequence.
11 comments:
I was about to tease you but the whole bloody fiasco is so deadly and destructive my heart's not in it.
The bigger question is at what point does the Ukrainian State begin to collapse? Another year perhaps? I imagine there may well be a violent coup attempt, just as there was against Hitler. Alternatively, the West's continuous crossing of red lines may finally provoke a dangerous response. I can see missiles deliberately targeting certain Western embassies in Ukraine followed by a Russian shrug. Oops. What a shame. Never mind. (After all, the Chinese embassy was hit when NATO attacked Serbia).
Ukraine collapse? Can't be ruled out, Wildgoose - but as Putin says, Ukrainians are (arguably) Russians too! With the same astonishing powers of endurance. Thucydides wrote that few nation-states survive a single winter under complete siege, and that none ever survived two. This one is four winters long already.
And, with Hungary now onside, there is the prospect of some serious EU dosh to come.
Pound for pound, the little guy is winning right now. And, yes, the bigger guy might still prevail, we've all known that all along.
Russia remains a petrostate with nukes, a large unmanageable landmass and a clunky industrial base. No one wants to help Russia, its rather abject position suits America and China and Europe. Putin is well protected, no one is likely to find it worthwhile to assassinate him - not worth the bother, more 'useful' alive. Better to let the country bleed slowly, Putin is helping that project.
The overall situation has not changed since the Tsars and it is hard to see where Russia can go. A bullet in Putin's head or a removal to a comfy dacha is not likely to change much.
Markets generally consist of a two or three big players, a handful of specialists and a tail of also-rans. Russia is at the tail of the specialists. We have the US and China as the big players, Germany, Japan, UK, India as the specialists and Russia and Brazil bringing up the rear.
If we consider the next 20 years where do we think Russia will go? They have lost the semiconductor boom and the AI boom, have (very) good software people but can't make any use of them. Essentially a one-trick pony - oil.
I can't see Putin easily putting his ego aside, the resurrection of the Russian sphere has been his wet dream for years, and he's not as wily as Xi who recognised that enough angry sheep can kill the strongest wolves, so may just blunder into an internal crisis entirely of his own making.
That said, it's clear that for all the Kremlin's controls the number of Russians fed up with the war is snowballing. The deal was Putin got to play Tsar, and the people got to feel good, not that Putin got to play Poundland Stalin and the people deal with no internet connection and occasional showers of drones.
Guess it all depends on when Putin's survival instincts kick in. Soon, hopefully.
As for after the war, whenever that may be, Putin's going to have to pick between two bad options economically. The war economy is causing enduring pain, unwinding it will cause a lot of pain before normality returns.
Nabulina's hat has no rabbits left, and those selling rabbit-bearing hats are either enjoying dominance over Russia (Xi), facing their ill chosen wars (Trump), or will involve some media messaging (the EU)
So, it's either needle westwards, or use Belarus and media messaging to make overtures that way.
I always like Nick’s speculation as it’s kind of out there, but not too wild as to be silly
The only observation I have is that, for Russia (as with many autocratic countries) it’s virtually impossible for those outside of the central core of the system to ever say who truly holds power, who has fallen from favour, who is under investigation and which faction is under attack.
What we can observe is that, in elite Russian politics, there has been a noticeable uptick in disappearances, demotions, shifting in the ranks of the middle tiers of the bureaucracy, illnesses alongside impending retirements without clear succession plans like Nabiullina.
Then what happens is once this patterns repeats enough times, something psychological happens. Instead of an appearance of stability, we start to see an elite survival game, palace intrigues, mutterings, screechy displays of professed loyalty, smears (like the notable covertly filmed video being circulating the top official with his lover) and so on.
Fascinating. But all we can do is watch
UPDATE: fuel rationing details finalised in Russia today.
Priority to military, police, FSB, "transport of critical infrastructure", and the Church**. Public transport as fuel is available; a quota of no more than 10% of available supplies for personal use. Ration cards to be issued in summer.
Massive black market absolutely guaranteed.
________________
** Church has been getting increasingly assertive of late: "You will lose the war if we stop praying for victory: we need to be granted tithes imposed on the entire population. And abortion must be made illegal. And neo-paganism.". Hard to compute for us; but Russia is, errr, different.
"Hard to compute for us"
Pretty sure WW2 saw services asking for Divine Intercession, and abortion was illegal until around 1968.
Elsewhere
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2026/may/27/mandelson-vetting-warned-ties-senior-figures-china-russia-israel
Mandelson’s links to China’s minister of finance, Lan Fo’an, the sanctions-hit Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and a former Israeli military intelligence general, Tamir Hayman, were all flagged by the agency as areas of concern shortly before he took up his post as the UK’s ambassador to the US, the sources said. They added that United Kingdom Security Vetting (UKSV) also noted Mandelson had a very close relationship with a fourth individual, who is British, that could be compromising. Another concern identified by the vetting agency, the sources said, was a £1m loan Mandelson received to invest in an Israeli startup. And UKSV noted separately, the sources added, that he appeared naive about the risk that historical relationships with other individuals could be exploited.
Yes, "naive" is always the word that comes to mind when one thinks of Peter Mandelson.
I get your point, but no one seems to be worrying about the effect of the loss of Russian energy on Europe, including the UK. Just as that clever idiot Fukuyama is saying "American decline is a direct product of Trump’s rise since 2016" when outsider Trump was a response to 40 years of US industrial decline (median real male wages actually dropped between 1973 and 2014), the speed of Chinese penetration of European markets post-2022 is frightening, as is the speed of European industrial decline. Lots of processes take mucho energy, and we ain't got any.
I keep trying to point out to the US-haters that if they thought Uncle Sam was a pain, wait until Uncle Wang dominates ...
"casualty rates exceeding enlistments"
How do you account for the enormous discrepancy in body exchanges between the two sides? Something like 25:1
I can appreciate that
a) as Russia have generally been advancing they can collect their own dead and keep quiet about numbers
b) it's possible that Russia are more careful about Ukrainian corpses whereas Ukraine just leave Russians to rot - given propaganda levels - I still remember that Uke medic who said wounded Russians should be castrated.
But it still seems a big discrepancy
Post a Comment