
The FSA doc starts with a pithy summary of all that’s wrong – so the correct issue is squarely on the table. The substance of their response is sound: a ‘general rule’ linking remuneration with risk management, plus some principles and guidance. As we’ve long advocated, the sanction is via linkage to capital adequacy requirements. Interestingly, the FSA is planning to go further (and faster) than the altogether less clever EC proposals, although both regimes are headed in broadly the same direction.
The trouble, as ever, lies in the degree of regulatory ambition. Despite protestations of determination, there is leisurely implementation timetable (why not demand compliance right now ? – nothing you are proposing goes beyond commonsense, or beyond what enlightened shareholders should already be demanding), and an early admission of weakness:
“Our Remuneration Code is not going to change the ‘bonus culture’ overnight”
Why not ? You have the principles, the power, and broad public support.
Well, we know the answer. Because you also have a craven government at your back, when what you need is resolute top-cover for some determined action.
ND
3 comments:
As a non-city person, I am puzzled at this argument that not having telephone number bonuses will drive away talent. Since this "talent" has indulged in massive risk taking which has caused large numbers of banks to collapse, why the effort to keep it?
some of the talent is indeed quite smart
and senior management / Boards have let them run riot, they wouldn't know how to unwind a lot of the positions
the talent will do whatever they are incentivised to do: so give 'em the right incentives !
It's too dangerous to attack the banks again after what they've put up with recently. The PM needs them to start lending again and forcing new regulations on them will not make them very happy.
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