Sorry for the protracted spacing between posts: both CU and meself are heavily preoccupied, the stories may some day be told.
Anyhow, I thought it might be time for a short update on the Russian ops in Ukraine. You might recall that we noted several weeks ago how the initial Russian invasion failed entirely to utilise the highly coherent and well considered Red Army operational doctrine that must surely have been what their [military] leadership was weaned on, and was of course purpose-made for ops across these very battlefields.
Now, it seems, they've dusted off those manuals; because we are told they are advancing on a couple of the fronts along parallel, mutually-supporting axes. Well, that's certainly part of what the book says: so far, so good.
They are doing this without the prescribed massive opening barrage by land and air, AND they are inching forward ... slowly.
For various reasons, This Won't Work. As with blitzkrieg, speed is of the essence. If, as seems to be the case, UKR forces are militarily well educated, well led, and adequately provisioned (we know they have phenomenal will to resist, and excellent operational intelligence) then even if outnumbered they will be able to do serious business.
Of course, sheer weight of numbers could eventually tell. But it's not clear Putin can muster that without some kind of quite extraordinary call-up - which would need a period of training - and major resupply (from China, one assumes). It's not clear to me he'll have anything significant to display on Victory Day.
Which, I suppose, makes it all the more likely he'll pull some other kind of stunt for that occasion. There seems to be trouble brewing in Moldova ...