It was a creditable effort to redress the balance a bit in his favour. Both the invasion of Khafji and the Scud attack on Israel can be seen as attempts to provoke the start of a ground war on terms of his own choosing, i.e., before the Coalition forces had fully lumbered into their desired state of readiness.
Not a bad line of thought on Saddam's part, because it was indeed only after more than a month of offensive air operations Jan-Feb 1991 that Norman Schwarzkopf felt ready to pull the trigger on the ground war. And the onset of hotter weather - not to mention political impatience - was giving his vast, unwieldy logistical undertaking as much of a hurry-up as could possibly be imagined. So, yes, the Coalition might have been thrown off kilter if Saddam's surprises had provoked ill-prepared ground operations ... and heavy casualties ... and adverse public reaction ...
Regrettably, the Scud aspects of Desert Storm (and after) are one area where I can't recount everything I know. However, there are still several interesting aspects that don't stray too far from what's in the public domain if you know where to look. (Hint: the fulsome websites of the US military and CIA, where paranoia about the past is not much in evidence.)
Firstly, we knew what we were worried about and had established a very excellent monitoring system that gave us real-time 'Scud Alerts' - real-time notification of missile launches, and very fast (and accurate) calculations on the trajectory and predicted target. Such was the state of development of satellite TV at the time, spookily we could often tune in to live broadcasts from Israel and watch the buggers landing, as it happened.
We therefore instantly knew that Israel was a primary strategic target. (Other Scuds landed on Saudi targets, too.) We also had rather good coverage of the whole region, of course** and immediately noticed Something Else. Upon the Scuds hitting home, some 50-60 Israeli aircraft took to the skies. And you didn't need to be a genius to guess what some of them were carrying under the fuselage. On the one hand, they would have wanted to keep their weaponry safely off the ground. On the other, they may well have decided to deploy said weaponry somewhat further to the east ...
The red telephones were buzzing off their hooks. Manifestly, wise counsels prevailed, and Israel decided to take it on the chin - and not without casualties. As with several self-denying actions of both the Russians and the USA over the nuclear decades (and probably India and Pakistan, too), you have to say this speaks well for the maturity of international statesmanship when the chips are down. It's not comfortable to think what might have happened if Saddam had gone for chemical warheads.
Scud-hunting thereafter became even more of a preocupation than it had been before - which is saying something. Anyone who is interested in these things will doubtless already have read the various first hand accounts of in-country SAS operations. There was a lot more besides. How do you hide a Scud launcher? They are mobile, but really quite big. Answer: there are cunning places you can use like underneath bridges over roads. Also, Iraq itself is really quite big, too. And, as mentioned before, even if you've spotted something on a satellite image, in those days the 100% computerised, 100% accurate locational techniques we now enjoy were not available.
We definitely didn't find them all during the 1991 conflict itself (though we did find all the superguns - a tale for another day). The Scud story, of course, moves seamlessly on from Desert Storm into Operation Rockingham, and thence into the whole WMD saga that still rumbles to this very day.
** As often mentioned hereabouts, the significance of Cyprus to UK foreign policy cannot be overstated