Aspects of Russia's War on Ukraine: Part 2 - the air war

Having considered developments on the land, we now turn to the air.  Many months ago there was a period of serious debate around whether Russia was going to go down the tactical nuclear route.  I never thought it remotely likely, but offered two hypothetical scenarios where it might be more plausible: if Ukraine threatened (in believable terms) to be about to retake Crimea; and/or if Russia committed its airforce - it was very noticeably absent from the battle at that time - and it was shot out of the skies.  The first of those is somewhat obvious, but what was the reasoning on the latter?

Answer:  unlike any of its ground assets, Russia cannot replace its airforce.  So it's been largely withheld, although as Ukraine's limited and now dwindling AA assets have slowly been depleted, Putin has gradually been hazarding more of his aircraft. 

A-50:  looks smart - but not many left

Until a few weeks ago, that was: and then two A-50s were shot out of the sky (by whom, exactly, remains unclear: the Russians are curiously anxious to claim it was friendly fire).   These critical planes are used for directing air assets into forward positions - and Putin doesn't have very many of them left (fingers of one hand now).  The Chinese are highly unlikely to offer them any substitutes, and I'm not at all sure India will sell them any either.  And skilled crews are even harder to come by - essentially irreplaceable in the short term.  Nobody bales out of one of those.  So the Russian airforce once more takes a step backwards - and just when they were perfecting the use of their new glide bombs.  

So - another period of relative impasse in the air: and I don't think this has been a 'pre-election' issue for Putin: he genuinely never wants to see his irreplaceable airforce seriously degraded.  This deprives Russia of one of the standard doctrinal components of what it needs to be doing to execute on its newly-revived 'Soviet' operational method (see earlier post), namely, the vital air contribution required towards the 'firepower' imperative.  My assessment that Putin dare not hazard his airforce stands - particularly in light of the crazy comments he lets his outriders make about taking on NATO in the foreseeable future.

For completeness, we should remember that Ukraine was similarly hobbled during its ill-fated 2023 offensive.  Supposedly planned initially on NATO lines, it was always missing the air component - which for NATO doctrine is even more critical than for Soviet.  'Ill-conceived' might be a better description.

What might break this current impasse?  A couple of things can be envisaged in terms of purely military considerations (i.e. putting aside some political stroke):

(1) Putin might decide to throw in the airforce anyway - if not right now, then perhaps in the expected Russian summer offensive.  Will Ukraine have received the currently-on-ice new package of US military aid by then?  If not, the Russian airforce might be expected to get away with fewer casualties than it would have at any time since Feb 24. 

(2) The Russians might come up with a novel work-around for the lack of A-50s.  The rapid and creative way technology is being adapted in this conflict by both sides, who knows?  I say 'adapted' because Russia has serious problems getting new Western electronic components for anything really advanced, albeit sanctions aren't remotely watertight.  

(3) The long-discussed F-16s might arrive in fair numbers on the other side.  If Ukranian pilots have been trained on the air-to-air mission, that really would keep the Russian aircraft at a distance.  But maybe they've been trained for close air support ... I just don't know.  The F-16 is versatile, but only in terms of how it's been fitted out and crewed: not every F-16 squadron can effectively taken on any role. 

Otherwise, this strange conflict will continue on its hybrid course for many more months to come.

In Part 3 we'll look at Germany's lamentable performance in all this.

ND