How long can Russia keep this up?

An odd barb sometimes thrown in this blog's direction (from who-knows-what troll factory) is that since Russia's invasion of Ukraine four years ago (four!) we have been predicting the imminent collapse of Russia itself.  Well, we haven't.  Ever.  In fact, right from the start we have said that ultimately there's nothing to stop Putin taking Ukraine if he really wants to - which, if anything, was far too generous to L'il Volodya and his ramshackle army.  Further, we've always remarked that the Russian capacity for enduring privation and general suffering should never be underestimated. 

But it is beginning to look as though Putin's stamina is waning.  There are so many straws in the wind: in no particular order -

• the 'victory' parade, hugely-reduced in scale and betraying obvious fears for its security, to the poit where Putin could be humiliated (the word used by Russian milbloggers) by Zelenskyy's gracious 'permission' to go ahead with the parade
• widespread and debilitating fuel shortages, courtesy of Ukraine's remarkable drone campaign ...
•  ... which, incidentally, has - yet again - blithely crossed one of Russia's stated nuclear red lines in terms of its scale ("the massive launch / take-off of aerospace attack weapons ... and their crossing of the state border of the Russian Federation")
• Russia's re-engagement with US negotiators, with the usual risible sabre-rattling
• the background PR planning for a sudden 'declaration of victory' - even based on today's status quo, if necessary
• serious domestic discontent at frequent blocking of the www and the (supposedly) imminent closure of access to Telegram, all in the name of 'security'
• internal dismay at the Hungarian election result, adding to keenly-felt impotence over Syria / Cuba / Venezuela
• serious economic issues, macro and micro - see below
• angst over the pitiful battlefield performance thus far in 2026 - zero net progress** in the spring/summer offensive campaign (intended to capture the remaining Donbass territory by autumn: Kkarkiv, Kherson and Odessa are rarely mentioned these days); casualty rates exceeding enlistments; and Ukraine has achieved, at least for now, superiority in the 'battlefield air interdiction' (BAI) stakes, courtesy of its swarms of very smart drones and their equally smart deployment in Russia's immediate rear, over and above the deeper oil refinery campaign 
• etc etc: I could go on.

Oh, and on the global scale, no joy from Xi on the long (very long)-awaited deal for more gas sales to China, a farce that we've often written about here in the past - check the 'Gazprom' tag - another serious strategic disappointment.

Even so, I still don't reckon on near-term "collapse", or defenestration of Putin.  He has plenty of tools to prevent either.  But I do say he's now beginning to think seriously in terms of an off-ramp: and many powerful people in Russia are even more seriously trying to get this to the top of the agenda.

In the midst of it all, the IISS has published this sober analysis.  It doesn't predict imminent collapse either; but it does set out the genuine problems and major dilemma Putin faces.  Between now and Xmas, I'm guessing we'll see recognisable, tangible movement taking place - in one direction or another.

ND 

________________

** Ukraine has in fact started making systematic small-scale territorial (re)gains all over the front, which in recent weeks have been larger than Russia's own small territorial gains.  On both sides these are to be understood in context: they are trivial in extent - largely infiltration sorties - and essentially opportunist in nature.  But there's a big difference: Russia's are intended, and indeed celebrated, as purposeful steps towards the taking of the Donbass; i.e. they are meant to be strategic.  Ukraine's, by contrast, are tactical spoiling measures - highly disruptive for any coherent Russian offensive this year.  But if they do indeed have that effect, they add up to having an important strategic consequence.