One of the features of Russian military thinking is how much it is geared to fighting on broad, open plains, with water-obstacles but not much in the way of topographic relief. This makes warfare like chess: both sides can see the disposition of the other's forces: everything starts with silently glaring across the table, wondering what's to be the first move**. As in any military planning, surprise is helpful: but it can be quite difficult to engineer it. Russia produces a lot of very good chess players.
[Contrast this with Western military thinking and practice, based as it is on the hilly, and highly-populated topographies of western Europe and the USA. Forests, towns, and above all hills, are generally available to make the enemy's task of figuring out what you are up to, just a bit more difficult. Reconnaissance is often thought of in terms of what's happening on the the other side of the hill. Wellington made a career out of conjuring up nasty surprises for his opponent using high ground to mask his manoeuvres (see his masterpiece at Salamanca, and most famously at Waterloo).]
With the steppes-based Russian thinking we've just rehearsed in mind: what did Soviet doctrine dictate for mounting a large-scale offensive? The answer (see the Battle of Kursk) included any amount of preparation, intelligence gathering, secrecy, deception, bluff and disinformation, plus (importantly) the use of depth, which Russia has in abundance. In very concrete terms, the later flowering of Soviet doctrine brought this all together in the concept of the operational manoeuvre group ('OMG', indeed!), a powerful, mobile ad hoc formation assembled just behind the front echelon in great secrecy so that it would not feature (qua identified formation) in the enemy's assessment of the Russian order of battle, and would emerge, suddenly and "from nowhere", to wreak havoc on the battlefield.
What's this got to do with 3rd Feb 2023? Most commentators have been saying for a month or so now that Russia is likely to make a big new offensive soon - and 'soon' might be in time for the anniversary of Putin's lunatic "come-as-you-are, all over in 3 days" foray last year. Just yesterday, the Russian Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media ordered the switching-off of all mobile phone comms in the Donbas. (We know that Russian forces have been dependent on mobiles from the very start, Putin's hasty attack not bothering with the traditional matter of ensuring secure comms as part of the package.) Now, comms falling silent is the classic signifier of an OMG being formed: all those big NATO air-recce sweeps of the Ukrainian theatre (there are 4 concurrently airborne as I write) are looking all the time for a 'nothingness of comms', inter alia. They've probably just found one.
Thing is, Ukraine knows all this stuff, too (and probably practices it); and it really is all a bit more difficult with modern recce techniques. Not least, the 'surprises from the depth' aspect becomes less of an element. We await the first chess-move with trepidation.
** Negotiations in Russia are like this, too. Long, long silences, punctuated by outbursts intended to disorient.