The 2025 Predictions compo was coming along - but has to wait! Because ...
A short while ago we suggested here that Putin was prone to forgetting that the enemy gets a vote; and that Ukraine, already shown to be adept at springing surprises, was likely to have a couple more up its sleeve before Trump convenes any kind of sit-down around a table somewhere. Yesterday saw the start of one such: a significantly renewed Ukrainian effort on Russian soil in the form of several attacks from their Kursk salient and elsewhere in that vicinity.
The Russian milbloggosphere is in characteristic turmoil over this, and with a new twist. Previous big surprises - the Wagner 'mutiny' of last year and the Kursk incursion in August - caught them with very little information to go on, and they floundered. This time, because the Kursk salient was already an area of active operations and an issue that exercised patriotic milbloggers greatly, they have a lot of contacts on the ground feeding them detailed, if extremely patchy and chaotic information. They also have the usual kneejerk drivel from the Russian MoD, but they know that's always going to be mendacious and wildly complacent. All in all, they haven't known what to make of it all, and initially resorted to parroting the official "all tidied up, nothing to see here, move along" stuff. But they knew that wasn't right.
As of this morning, they've settled for a handful of agreed conclusions:
- what's been seen so far isn't the main Ukrainian thrust, which is yet to come;
- even this "diversionary" activity has met with some success;
- Ukraine is deploying electronic warfare measures that are neutering Russian drones, along with some seemingly effective all-arms coordination in depth.
Finally, the most knowledgeable blog-writers have held back from drawing preliminary conclusions altogether (and of course Putin, as ever in such circumstances, remains entirely silent and missing from the public sphere), which is wise because the Ukrainians are just as good at chess as the Russians and have had many months to plan this move. The date of Trump's inauguration has, after all, been known for quite a while.
Am I going to fall into the first-draft-of-history-trap here? No: just a handful of points.
- this "blow of last hope" should have been blatantly obvious to Putin et al, both in general and in detail: yet again, his ability to be thrown by tactical events seemingly knows no limits: we can adduce half a dozen such unforced errors around his sphere of (notional) influence since the Syrian debacle alone. He may have a brutal 'theory of (long-run) victory', but if he trips up and falls flat on his face in the meantime, it might still not work out.
- plenty of time between now and Jan 20 for more ...
- this year has seen some deeply impressive mil-tech advances from Ukraine's still highly capable defence-industrial base. I've been expecting the electronic warfare anti-drone breakthrough for 18 months - they really needed it for their 2023 summer offensive, but better late than never. There may be more to come on this front, too: and while tech advances tend to be countered by the other side after a while, the issue right now is the next couple of months.
ND
28 comments:
Seeing as this site is fond of historical analogies, consider the Wehrmacht's March 1945 counter-offensive. Despite its temporary initial success, it didn't change the inevitable outcome of the Second World War. Nor will this.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Spring_Awakening
But what does Russia consider as “victory” i.e. the conclusion of the course of the war?
Demilitarisation, denazification, de-left-bone-connected-to-de-right-bone are such vague and meaningless terms, we can’t make head nor tale of those. So what is “victory” and, if we can’t be sure what it is, what does each Ukrainian tactic do (or not do) to imperil whatever that is?
Victory as defined by VVP is highly unlikely, IIRC it includes NATO back to 1991 as well as the complete removal of Bandera/Nazi ideology. Neither are very likely as long as the US State Department is full of people who bear an ancestral grudge over the looting of great-great-great granpappys store in Minsk by drunken Cossacks.
It has to be said British WW2 policy on captured Soviet prisoners took realpolitik pretty damn far - ordinary Russians captured by Germany were returned to Stalin's tender embrace, while Waffen SS divisions full of Soviet citizens were shipped to the UK and Canada, where 70-odd years later one of them got a standing ovation from the Canadian Parliament and Western media.
Talking of realpoltik, Jimmy Carter actually walked it like he talked it
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/2024-12-29/jimmy-carter-declassified-obituary
In this memo, Brzezinski holds forth on an issue that “has been gnawing at me recently,” his weakly disguised impatience with the president for failing to make use of some of the more Machiavellian tools of statecraft. These included the “demonstration of force,” the need to “infuse fear,” to “manipulate,” and to utilize “black propaganda.” ...Then commenting on Brzezinski’s recommendation about “saying publicly one thing” while “negotiating something else,” Carter writes simply: “Lying?”
I don't know about Putin, but following various Telegram sites I sense very little trepidation about Kursk 2.0, but a general feeling that this is more of a reconnaissance in force and that there are reserves not yet committed. "Wait and see". Not really seen the F16s yet, for example.
While you're correct that drone jamming has improved, Russia apparently has unjammable fibre optic controlled drones, which unreel fibre-optic control cable like a TOW missile unreels wire.
I'd have thought that must be very fragile, but I'm pretty ignorant on current developments.
Well, I could have told Putin about the perils of trying to engineer regime change, but he never asked. Besides, I don't give free advice. Why should I?
Incidentally, does that mean we're in favour of regime change now?
(Full Disclosure: I was neutral to broadly approving of regime change in the past. Iraq sort-of changed my mind and Afghanistan completely changed it -- so I can hardly blame Putin for having a go. But I can blame him for not reading up on the lessons of past failures. Not least Russia's own in Afghanistan.)
Anon: on Jimmy Carter, worth reading this:
https://ourtime.substack.com/p/jimmy-carter-1924-2024
Readers of this blog will likely find this analysts insight as interesting as I do. Consistently of a very high quality.
https://themilitaryanalyst.com/2025/01/06/kursk-counter-offensive/
RS - thanks for that link, and, blimey, (s)he & I agree on almost everything!
FWIIW, we are not the same person. I don't imagine either of us would claim our analyses are rocket science.
For anon @ 6:14 - the linked article includes a photo of a fibre-optic cable drum
That is excellent analysis, with the normal limitations of observational evidence rather than direct military reporting through the chain of command.
Touched on at the end is the vexed question of the Russian economy. I neither make any claims as to its vulnerability nor do I take with any credibility Russia’s own reporting. It’s a classic information vacuum. Russia publishes statistics, of course, but I doubt even they believe them. External commentators rush to predict collapse — but three years already. We’re reduced to proxy sources of information and these are by necessity flawed. Sanctions are clearly hurting (we know this because every day my social media timeline is festooned with bombastic “sanctions haven’t had any impact on Russia and are devastating the west!” sort of stuff; there’d only be effort, energy and bandwidth devoted to such messaging if sanctions were having at least some effect). But then again, there’s a lot of ruin in a nation. Russia included.
"he & I agree on almost everything"
Yes, there's quite a resemblance - especially in the "how will it make Putin feel?" stuff.
In one sense it's understandable - today's Russia is pretty much Putin's Russia, he's delivered them from the decade and a half of disaster, and runs the show in a way that you couldn't accuse Biden (or even Trump, given how the military disobeyed him) of. If Biden had dropped dead on Jan 20, 2020, would US foreign policy be changed one iota? I suppose there was Hunter's million-dollar job ...
OTOH I keep thinking the Putin-focus is Rules for Radicals #17.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rules_for_Radicals
"Pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, and polarize it."
Interesting that the argument here
" Ukraine is increasingly close to pushing it over the edge – Ukraine has to be the one left standing when the collapse finally comes"
is pretty much the pro-Russian view, too - that Ukraine will inevitably collapse as long as Russia keeps on keeping on. While I'm sure Syria cheered the bad people up no end (and unpleasant news from Syria will vanish in our media - who now reports from Libya?)
a) I don't think Syria = Russia
b) I think China would move heaven and earth to prevent any such thing. Obviously they don't want full on confrontation with the West - why should they, as every year more industry shuts down here and opens there - but while they'll postpone it for as long as possible, they must know (unless the leadership are useless, which they don't seem to be) that they are next on the list after Russia.
Great testing ground for NATO - they can play with stuff, see what Russia have and work on counter measures, while Ukrainians die. But I assume that works both ways, and Chinese PLA guys must be doing the same on the Russian side.
It all makes you appreciate Jimmy Carter more. Reagan, otoh listened to Brezinski, as did Thatcher.
Clive - there’s a lot of ruin in a nation. Russia included.
Russia more than most, in fact.
Anon @ 11:19 - you haven't read that Carter link yet, then?
With regards to the Russian economy, it's been handled amazingly well - Nabiullina has done some miracle work there, and somehow managed to stay in the role even with Putin being apparently unhappy with things, despite the issues being entirely his fault.
They are running out of road though, Russians are feeling the pinch from high inflation and interest rates. The ISIS attacks have also crippled their immigration strategy, feeding into the inflation.
Even if Ukraine collapses tomorrow and Putin can call it a win, unwinding the war economy is going to hurt.
About the only benefit Russia will end up seeing from this is a bumper crop of Paralympians for the next decade, assuming they're allowed to compete.
And that it has come down to who collapses first, Russia or Ukraine, really is a damning indictment of Putin's management.
Correct - there's a lot to digest there, and I have a tree to dispose of and a lot of decorations to go in the loft.
"who collapses first, Russia or Ukraine, really is a damning indictment of Putin's management"
Is it? He's fighting a different sort of war, the like of which we've not seen before, where he's not allowed to strike many of the combatants, sat in Germany at NATO HQ, in the States and in many other places including IIRC somewhere Thatcham way.
Anyway, "the battle decides" as some Frenchman once said.
If the war, sorry, Special Military Operation, could be won by being whiny and victimey, Russia really would have been in Kyiv in three days.
Living not far down the road from Thatcham, I must admit I’ve not seen any fighting from the “combatants” there. Nor any aircraft departing. Nor missiles being fired. So not sure where the hostilities are taking place. Maybe in the Sainsbury’s car park?
@anon 12:10 that's hardly the case.
In the Korean war Russian, Soviet piloted fighters actually engaged with the US, and in Syria, Wagner engaged with US troops.
Throughout the Cold War, Russia assisted, advised, and armed enemies of the West. As did we in the reverse.
So, no, nothing new.
Americans often complain about Rules for Radicals #17:
"Pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, and polarize it."
That amuses me because it is a precise description of the modus operandi of Thomas Jefferson.
Clive
Denison Barracks, Hermitage, Thatcham, RG18 9TP
Yes, can confirm, definitely no shooting. Or combat of any description. Unless you count some drunk squaddies at Wetherspoons on a Saturday night.
Everything new. In Korea if you wanted to fight the Chinese you had to physically send the Glosters or some fighter pilots.
Now, you can send a drone from Sigonella, or maybe a British Boeing from Cyprus to do figure 8s off Crimea, people anywhere can analyse the info, collate it with satellite photos and intercepted comms to choose a target, and program an "Ukrainian" missile remotely, which will have terrain maps created in the US and navigate using the maps, US satellites and US inertial guidance systems.
All is changed, changed utterly. And, just as in WW2, things are changing fast. I remember the Bayraktar drone was 2022s wunderwaffen.
Yes, indeed. That’s before we get to grey areas like commercially available data and things like that Starlink and Telegram — notionally civilian services without which Ukraine and possibly Russia too would have some big headaches.
As an aside, if I were wanting to put the biggest stick in the spokes of the wheels for the Ukrainian war efforts, I’d incapacitate a hardly-known and innocuous sounding factories making the most obscure thing you’d never heard of, almost certainly. And/or sink every ship carrying the product in question.
And what is that? Standby generators, that’s what. Although given they in almost constant use, by the tens of thousands of units, “standby” is a little inaccurate. The best in the business — and what else does Ukraine get, free of charge, natch? — are Japanese, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to be precise . You name it, they do it. https://engine-genset.mhi.com/industrial-generator-set
The war would be over in weeks if these were stopped. But, oh, the dilemma, here as always… what is a piece of military equipment supplied and serviced by a participant in the war and what is not?
Clive - the sort of thing you see by the dozen in the compounds dotted all over the UK for those rare occasions when there are power outages?
@anon 5:14 - is your issue with new technology or assistance from external partners?
Every war has introduced new technology in order to gain an advantage, from the stirrup to the airplane, and assistance from interested parties is nothing new either.
None of which detracts from Putin being responsible for screwing things up to such a point that it has devolved from a 3 day SMO, to a game of who collapses first.
Yes, they’re pretty ubiquitous now.
What’s new for an Ukraine is the sheer scale of their deployment. This isn’t just a few scattered around data centres, shopping malls or hospitals. This is a million or more, everything from 1kVa powering a coffee shop, through 5-10kVa keeping a lift and district heating pump running in an apartment block on to 5,000-10,000kVa for an electrified railway track circuit or being daisy chained supplying 40MW for a large town.
Which makes me wonder about Russian attempts to “destroy the electrical grid”. This is the third winter (okay, we’re only half way through the current one but that’s enough to demonstrate that Ukraine isn’t going to get plunged into months of darkness without heating or power) we were told that Russia would “destroy the electrical grid”. Yet it patently hadn’t been destroyed and, we can fairly safely conclude, won’t be.
How is that? Russia has invested in considerable ordnance utilisation in a well planned, well coordinated and well executed series of thundered, if not thousands of strikes on electricity generation and distribution assets. The cost must be hundreds of millions of dollars equivalent or even north of a billion. But it has been any measure been, at best, only partially successful and, at worst, has failed to achieve a strategic aim. What’s happened?
Relying on speculation, as no-one gets to talk to Russian military command, I’d have to hazard a guess that the attacking of civilian electric power supply systems was an old Soviet-era strategy which got dusted off and implemented in Ukraine. But in the past 20 years, there’s been a revolution in the cost, availability and reliability of standby generator sets — and their increasingly common solid state successor, Lithium Ion battery storage. You can literally flood a country with the things. Which Japan (and to a degree, the US) did. Russia simply didn’t realise this technological development had happened and how you could distribute and decentralise electricity generation and distribution. So they tried a 40 year-old military strategy and, in the face of increasing evidence it wasn’t working and then trying to figure out if it could ever work, Russia just kept on trying the same old thing.
No great loss, really, just a few hundred Iskander missiles and a housing drones. But you take a strategic miscalculation like that, and add it to a few other similar strategic miscalculations, and suddenly, what should have been an easy victory starts to look a bit of a costly quagmire.
"is your issue with new technology or assistance from external partners?"
Not an issue, an observation that the US can now fight Russia remotely and deniably. New tech has made a qualitative difference to the battlefield which the "laws of war" haven't caught up with.
Back in Korea days, if we were involved, bodies were involved - ask the Glosters. Now the odd "adviser" gets hit in a rear area and is reported as having a heart attack in Belgium, but that's about it.
Again, that's always been possible, the method and ease has changed, that's it.
Spies, 5th columnists, saboteurs... Stalin had the equivalent of influencers embedded in unions across Europe.
The instruments may change, the tune doesn't
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