Wednesday, 21 January 2026

Rogues I Have Known: James Allcock, part 1

Pic:  Daily Telegraph

There won't be many readers who have heard of James Allcock (died at the age of 90, obit here, which you should maybe read first). De mortuis nil nisi bonum, obviously; and I'll immediately say, he was a very nice guy who commanded tremendous loyalty, which (generally) speaks well for a man.  But he was also, how shall we say, a tough customer.  Being, as he was, the head buyer for the old British Gas when it was a monopoly.  I shall explain.  At length.

BG took on the form we most associate with it when North Sea gas hove into view in the late '60s.  The late (and not very lamented) Dennis Rooke was given responsibility for converting the nation rapidly from town gas to natural gas, in which he succeeded, using methods that left a lasting and very equivocal legacy - a story for another day.   It seems from the above-referenced obit, Allcock (I never knew this) had a hand in it, too.

However, it was in his prime as BG's head buyer of gas from upstream producers that I first met him.  Did I say 'buyer'?  BG enjoyed, not only a statutory monopoly, but also a monopsony, which it enforced zealously.  So if your company had discovered gas in the North Sea (and later, off the west coast, too), you had nowhere to go but to headmaster Allcock's study.  The only question was, how painful the experience was going to be.  He had only two forces providing a weak form of discipline on his rapacity:  (a) some customers (particularly industrials)[1] still had the ability to use alternative fuels, mostly oil of one grade or another; and (b) the Norwegians, at least, had alternative outlets for their gas.  Otherwise, he could generally have his wicked way with you; and he & his opposite numbers in equally monopsonistic European utilities used to swap notes gleefully on how roughly they'd rogered their victims.

That said, he was a perfect gentleman, and built a department consisting of three teams of negotiators to carry out his purchasing policy.  You need to know that these negotiations were for astonishing amounts of gas, since Allcock insisted on buying the entire quantity of gas in a given field, which might be producing the stuff for as many as 50 years[2].  So the amounts of money on the table were correspondingly stupendous; the sellers were very big companies themselves (basically, the '7 Sisters' of yore plus the Norwegians, and various hangers-on); and the negotiations were interminable.  Two years for the sale of a single large field's gas was par for the course. 

Each of his teams was led by another perfect gentleman[3] and some courteous juniors, whose conduct was extremely stylised in the oriental fashion.  There were three juniors to a team, and each had their allotted role.  #2 would occasionally get to speak out loud in the meetings; #3 might get to whisper something to #2; and #4 was silent, taking notes.  There would also always be one or more of BG's exceptionally proprietorial external lawyers, who did all the drafting.  Indeed, all the meetings were held at the offices of BG's lawyers, the then firm of Denton Hall Burgin & Warren.  This was to the advantage of all the participating negotiators, since lunch came in the form of a Fortnum's hamper, and the fridge was well stocked too.

Thus, it was possible to be thoroughly rogered by Allcock and his teams, and enjoy the whole process greatly.   One or two of the juniors might have been redbrick, but inevitably the main players on all sides (whichever oil company was selling its gas) were Oxbridge: even the US sellers, and in some cases the Norwegians, made sure to field the "right people" for this arcane negotiation ritual.  Literary references (which would sometimes find their way into the drafting) and Latin jokes were prized currency.

This stately and splendid abuse of BG's statutory powers lasted from the late '60s to the early 90's.  Allcock had to weather a couple of storms - which he did with panache - before eventually competition started developing for real, as I'll describe in part 2.  I'll also give some examples of the outrageous abuse of its monopoly BG perpetrated when this regime still had the power to do so.  

And, to cut to the chase for part 1, Allcock - in his urbane manner - fought the onset of competition all the way.  Given that BG retained a de facto monopoly/monopsony for years after it lost its statutory rights, and never lost its natural monopoly on the pipeline system until it relinquished it voluntarily by demerger, his powers to do so were baleful and very great.  But when, in the early 90's, it was manifestly almost over for his way of doing business, I had a drink with him one day and asked him this: why this stubborn rearguard defence, when the end-point was clear?  I drew the analogy with Germany's immense WW2 losses on the Eastern front: if they'd called it quits after Kursk, say, and fallen back in good order to the German border, Berlin may never have fallen to Russia[4].  As it was, fighting for every hectare they lost countless men for arguably a much worse result.  Likewise, BG was (at the time I posed the question) still mulishly refusing to concede market share, and using its enduring natural monopoly on the pipeline system to make life as difficult as possible for its new competitors, once they arrived on the scene, even knowing that there was every intention on the part of government to make sure the new entrants succeeded.  If BG had fallen back on its then-remaining de jure monopoly of the residential gas market (which it didn't lose until much later) - devilishly difficult for competitors to make inroads into, and not nearly as profitable as the infinitely more accessible industrial & commercial sectors - it could have held that till kingdom come.

He smiled, poured us another drink, and said: "Every day's delay is another monopoly pound in our pockets."

More to follow.  In the meantime: RIP, James, you old rogue. 

ND

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[1] For a sustained period until the late 1980s it was illegal in the UK, and in most of Europe and the USA, too, to use natural gas for power generation .  Bizarre, but true.

[2] The largest North Sea gas field, Leman, started production in 1969 and is still producing to this day

[3] In the early years, at least - things changed towards the end, but, no names, no packdrill 

[4] A counterfactual for the historians, obviously.  But it served my illustrative purpose.

13 comments:

dearieme said...

Christianity includes the doctrine of Thou shalt not covet.

Monopolists covet and then seize.

Anonymous said...

"he predicted that the liberalisation of gas and electricity markets would end badly because the market had no interest in security of supply, only profit"

I know ND's not a huge fan of nationalised industry, comments?

(I see the market response to security of electricity supply in the diesel generator compounds scattered over the UK. Amazed the travellers haven't pinched all the diesel.)

Nick Drew said...

Anon, @ ND's not a huge fan of nationalised industry, comments?

You are correct. Or monopolies of any kind, public or private. Part 2+ will give examples.

And Allcock was 100% wrong. Post privatisation, the ONLY thing the competitive markets haven't been able to resolve, by themselves (+ necessary periodic regulatory interventions), is the farce of Net Zero, it being arbitrary & with no basis in any kind of commercial logic, even at the national level.

As regards security of supply, I have recounted here before (links to follow) the tremendous example of the development of LNG terminals - summary:

- It became clear to all informed participants that the UK would cease to be a net exporter of nat gas some time in the mid '00s.
- thus, more imports would be required, and Norwegian supplis would not be enough on their own
- => proper, modern LNG terminals required. This is the market adding 2 + 2 and correctly getting 4.

Then, without an iota of government direction**, still less even a penny of government subvention or underwriting or guarantees of minimum income, private capital brought about the very timely construction of new LNG terminals on a strategically significant scale

That's the market, putting its own money on the line, based on its own assessments, "in the cause of security of supply" - if you want to talk of it in those terms. I'd say, it was simply identifying a business opportunity: security is a product and people are willing to provide it if the business case is there.

That's just one example. Allocock Was Wrong. (nice chap, though)
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**HMG didn't think we'd go net short quite as soon as we did, and didn't believe enough LNG would be available. The oil companies knew better on both scores, needless to say

Anonymous said...

Ta.

3 terminals, Grain, South Hook and Dragon nearby. Couldn't we just buy the stuff from Norway? We have the pipes already IIRC.

Nick Drew said...

You've come to the right place, Anon.

(a) more pipeline capacity from Norway was also built - privately! - in the same period

(b) Norwegian supplies were still never going to be enough (Norway has a lot of other European customers)

(c) when it comes to security of supply, diversification is a good thing in its own right - and the market delivers that, too!

(d) Norway likes to diversify its customer base for exactly the same reason, too!

Anonymous said...

Ta. Must say I was impressed with Norway on my one visit (other than that the whole east half of Oslo is like Bradford) - anywhere where a young guy outside of finance can afford an ocean going yacht before 30 - he sold steel pipes to gas companies - is pretty neat.

Nick Drew said...

Yes, but could he afford to drink whiskey in Oslo?

Anonymous said...

We found a (relatively) cheapo cafe by the working harbour - Woolies cafe style tray self service - and toasted our son, about to crew to Greenland - previous experience - small dinghy on a lake with Scouts.

EC said...

The obit makes much of his “thoughtful” Christianity. Obviously not thoughtful enough to realize that his professed religion considers taking advantage of another’s weak position to get an unfair deal to be a species of theft. Every bit as much as fraud or larceny.

Nick Drew said...

EC - this wasn't something I specifically heard him say, but I did hear it from the lips of several senior BG types, and from their counterparts in Eu monopolies: "it is our duty to screw the producers, on behalf of our (captive) customers!".[1]

BG went further, and said "it is our duty to screw our industrial customers[2][3] in order to subsidise our residential customers". They said this as though it was a statutory duty. So I looked into it, and discovered that, no, their statutes as a state-established monopoly did not require them to do this - it was a social policy of their own devising.

Of course, the lie was given to all this crap by the gold-plating and pure waste they engendered throughout their organisation, and by what they imposed on others - see followup posts next week.
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[1] In France, they call this nonsense "le Service Public". EDF and GDF were even worse for pure waste, almost on a Soviet scale

[2] Except those industrials that had realistic alternatives; plus, most importantly, ICI which was their biggest single customer by almost an order of magnitude. These, too, were subsidised. In the case of ICI, which was deeply subsidised beyond anything the sheer scale of their business would naturally suggest, I accept this was indeed part of a silent agreement with HMG, as a strategic component of industrial policy. ICI - I knew them well - was a disgraceful example of "why do a hard day's work when you could go lobbying instead" and its demise was inevitable. More stories for another day.

[3] Such was the degree of rapacity BG showed towards the vast majority of industrials, that when competition at last got underway in the very late '80s / early '90s, the flight of industrials to sign up with new entrants was tempered only by the administrative ability of the new entrants to complete the (BG-designed!) paperwork for the transfer. A massive win-win for customer and new supplier alike: the former could enjoy a decent discount while the latter could charge a decent margin - and still undercut BG! By the same token, the residential sector, being theretofore subsidised, as well as being much more complex to service - was of no interest to the new entrants. (There were other factors, too:, I am simplifying a bit).

jim said...

The purported socialistic tendencies made me think of 'the K shaped economy'. The wealthy and big corps ride the upper bar of the K and the proletariat ride the lower bar. The mix being OK if the pie gets bigger.

The notion being that the socialists take away from the upper bar and provide public services to the lower bar whereas the conservatives cut back on public services and give to the upper bar. Staying elected implies the movements either way are fairly small if the pie is not getting bigger - or in our case is getting smaller.

There does seem a difference in attitude within the various strata of society. Some of the better educated I met were fairly benign in their attitude. One upper floor of my employer was inhabited by 'the bastards' with a devil take the hindmost opportunity pricing attitude. Above them lived some richer but less violent souls. Some go getters were fairly vicious, a big insurer had a product 'designed to screw the C3s and C2s'. So they did for nearly 30 years until nemesis caught up and they had to hand some back.

Mr Allcock seems to have sailed a benign-ish course and we hope now has his just rewards. Enjoying a read of The Dictator's Handbook.

Anonymous said...

Thank you ND. Now do The Bouncing Czech.........

Anonymous said...

"a big insurer had a product 'designed to screw the C3s and C2s'"

Sounds like an "Over 50's Funeral Plan" - a not-very-good-value Whole Life policy.