Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts

Monday, 4 August 2025

What does von der Leyen / Trump 'deal' say about EU?

The French and Germans don't seem best pleased about what she's done, and we can see why.  There might be several theses or lines of thought on this.

  1. It's easy to portray it as craven, but it's solid realpolitik, and shows the EC** in a good light: their strategic priorities (bind USA into European defence / maintain support for Ukraine / stay on reasonable talking terms with Trump) were clear and they did the necessary in a decisive & fairly expeditious way. 
  2. It's an existential triumph for the EC qua bureaucracy-priesthood, not only on the basis of 1 above, but because von der Leyen's people roundly ignored the national governments and have got clean away with it.  German & French vetoes?  They're history.
  3. It's a tactical triumph for those wily EC negotiators: their preferred stratagem is to grind down the other side by dragging negotiations out into endless detail / prevarication / cherry-picking / make-believe governance issues (see Brexit); but when faced with an emergency, they still came up with the goods.  Knowing that Trump just lurves Big Numbers and of course Done Deals, they've "committed" to bizarre amounts of imports from the USA, and there isn't a cat's chance in Hell that these commitments can be honoured.  But the Dumb Donald goes home with his triumph (his own people certainly ain't gonna tell him he's been suckered - and maybe he knows it anyway but just loves the immediate optics)  and life carries on.
  4. It suits DE and FR to bellyache and blame von der Leyen, but they know there was little alternative, and have let her do the deed - & front for it.  (But where, ultimately, does 'strategic bellyaching' lead?  Surely, only an ever-growing Euroscepticism across the whole continent?) 
Some of the above are perfectly mutually consistent.  Any other views?

ND

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** I.e. the very real Brussels priesthood, not the abstract political entity known as the EU


Tuesday, 11 March 2025

Epochal change in our economic situation

What are the epochal economic changes in my lifetime?  I'm no student of macroeconomics, as any reader here will know, so I don't have a ready list.  The rise of China comes first to mind, along with its concomitant, the (relative) de-industrialisation of the West, and its precursor, the collapse of (left-wing / doctrinal) communism.  The oil crises of the 1970s.  Economic migration towards the West and the suppression of labour costs.  And ... economic "neoliberalism"?  The period of the "great moderation"? - maybe.  The banking crisis 2007-09? - not really: what changed?  Any others people care to nominate?  [I'm not looking for lists of new technologies here.] 

Anyhow, now we have a serious new candidate: the Keynsian turn of Germany announced just days ago, which is probably just the cornerstone of the EU letting rip, as many in the EC and several member countries have wanted to for decades now.  So much latent borrowing power!  Assuming it actually happens as presaged, expenditure on weaponry (of course) but also infrastructure, stands to become a truly massive boom, with the added twist that there could be a strong strategic reluctance to outsource all this upsurge in manufacturing and construction to China.

The markets don't think it all looks so obviously great for the USA, either: are we seeing the turning-point in a 25-year bull run on the DJ, and maybe early suggestions of the USD going out of favour?  US recession, even, as the tariffs bite?  Nice one, Donald - though at least there will be plenty of ongoing demand for his natural gas.  

Writing as a non-economist, I'd say that the whole thing also sounds rather inflationary, too - for all of us.   The older I get, the gladder I am for my substantial inflation-hedge. 

What do we all reckon, at this critical juncture? 

ND

PS - did you notice the Irish offered themselves as part of the Macron/Starmer coalition of the willing?!  See, this is real ! 

Saturday, 9 November 2024

Germany: looking grim - energy policy doomed

We've often said hereabouts that Germany is never to be underestimated for the things it does strongly.  That, of course, includes vigorously digging deep holes for itself: Es irrt der Mensch so lang er strebt  - and there's no striver like a German who's got religion.  Prior to Ukraine Germany was already embroiled in a nonsensical 'energy transition' policy - Energiewende - that we've written about here several times.  Formerly I took a simple & cynical view on this: they can probably afford it; and it's better to watch them do the experimentation on moonbeams from cucumbers etc, than do it ourselves.

Since Putin kicked off in 2022, they've bizarrely doubled down on what was at the time an embryonic policy, namely to become a hydrogen economy.  The (natural) gas sector in Germany had been privately working on this for a while, using its own funds (always a good sign) , wishing to have a lifeboat for its vast sunk-cost infrastructure against the scenario of natgas falling as far out of favour as have nukes, lignite and hard coal in their turn.  Quite fairly, the entire German state doesn't favour UK-style deindustrialisation as an alternative approach to 'green'.  In some kind of arm-waving fantasy, hydrogen seemed to be the answer - first 'blue' H2, swiftly to be followed by 'green' H2, and getting started with imports (another fantasy; but a lot of countries from Australia to Saudi keep saying they'll be big exporters any year now).

Being Germans with a Policy, they've now zoomed past the sensible 'private experiment' stage and have erected a complex system of targets and subsidy structures for hydrogen projects, both upstream and downstream.  (I have tried to get to grips with it in all its byzantine complexity, but it's not easy - and indeed may not represent anything you can understand rationally at all.)  Every German firm that might conceivably participate in the putative H-economy is dabbling in this, all hoping someone else will jump first.  Along the whole length of the putative H2 supply chain, every single major scheme that was more-or-less on the starting blocks at the start of this year has either foundered already or suffered major setbacks.  

A key player in the German economy - until a couple of days ago - was Federal Minister of Finance Christian Lindner.  I have a very good friend who knows the man, and tells me Lindner was a lone voice of sanity in a cabinet of lunatics.  Lindner's overarching view is that his fellow countryman have too much in the Manic Enthusiasm department, and little instinct on the matter of value for money.  These two things he saw coalescing to baleful effect in the hydrogen policy.

What now?  Ploughing on regardless would be very German, but maybe even they are beginning to see it for the nonsense it is.  Perhaps everyone hangs on until after COP29, and then the ructions really begin.  However much we might mock, we'll all feel the impact if the bicycle topples over. 

Es irrt der Mensch so lang er strebt.  Yes, Goethe had it right: and as he also suggested, they just can't stop striving ...

ND

Sunday, 9 June 2024

'We are in 1938': excellent weekend read

 

'Defence', you understand
... if you don't mind your weekend peace being rudely shattered.

From the Graun, of all places.

ND

Thursday, 21 March 2024

Aspects of Russia's war on Ukraine: (3) Germany

In times gone by Germany as a whole, and most German businessmen I have met, liked to come across as the grown-ups of Europe.  Oh, their worldly wisdom!  How I remember the condescending post-Brexit lectures on the imminent departure of the whole of the City of London for Frankfurt ... [1]

Well, it didn't seem to get them very far when the custard hit the fan.  Their two aces - being deeply in bed with Russia, and exporting like crazy to China, didn't turn out quite the bankers they had assumed when Putin played his own hand: cue breast-beating and hand-wringing.  So what happened next in Germany?  Well, lots of things but I'll highlight a few:

  • A typically dynamic German practical response: massive shift towards LNG to replace NS1 / NS2 gas - long before 'someone' exercised the Semtex option
  • Hugely accelerated efforts on a large-scale shift to hydrogen fuel as the supposed saviour of German manufacturing (no tangible results yet, though)
  • Meaningful slump in said manufacturing sector (whether this is permanent 'demand destruction' is yet to be established) with baleful economic repercussions
  • Promises (as yet unfulfilled) of much more defence spending and a full-scale reorientation of policy
  • Lame & abject 'followerism' as regards military aid for Ukraine: truly, pathetically demeaning
And now, the 'intercepted military telephone discussion' of a couple of weeks back.  WTF?  Afterwards, Scholz had the gall to suggest that everyone still has complete trust in Germany as a secure & reliable military ally.  Errr, no.  Hasn't been any for years before this incident; even less (if that's possible) now.  They don't get a look-in on anything of importance.

In short, from having a plausible case for being the grown-ups of Europe, Germany now looks like the over-sized, know-nothing teenager sulking in its bedroom and defying calls to come down for the family outing.  What and how long it takes for Germans to throw off this current malaise is not something I have a detailed view on, except that nobody should ever underestimate their ultimate capacity for hard work and self-sacrifice, whether in a good cause or a bad one.  Doesn't look as though it will be in time to be of much assistance to Ukraine, though.  I suppose keeping out of the way isn't nothing, in the circumstances.  It may be the best that can be hoped for.

While we all wait to learn the outcome of this surely-temporary impasse, there's a question lingering in my mind: did Mutti realise what she was doing all those years of 'drawing Russia into the fold', and how misconceived it was?  Obviously, the German polity embraced her always-implausible policy wholesale: as Nietzsche said, " 'Credo quia absurdus est': that is what the German spirit wants" [2].

Merkel mostly keeps her peace on the matter, and we can see why; but early on, there were some hints at remorse (- unlike the shameless Schröder, only too happy to draw his enormous Russian stipend: historical, ocean-going, world-scale treachery).  She, remember, was a prize-winning Russian student: fluent in the language, in communism - and surely also in the Russian mentality?  I don't have a tenth of her first-hand experience of Russia; and for a westerner the 'Mysterious Russian Soul' takes a bit of adjusting to.  But I still reckon to have more insight than she seems to have deployed.  When you've been systematically exposed to all things Russian (including the bully Putin personally - the man who maliciously enjoyed literally setting the dogs on her) as long as she has, it's pretty weird to misread them quite as badly as she did.  I don't consider her guilty of Schröder-sin, so I can only assume her neuro-wiring is extremely well geared for language-learning but not for reading human beings.  It happens out there on the autism spectrum.

This post hasn't been much centred on Ukraine (for which apologies).  It was the Russian invasion that triggered Germany's present regression, of course - but we must surely assess there was a major fault-line in the coherence and wisdom of German geo-economic policy and overall statescraft that would have become manifest eventually, one way or another.  What are the likely consequences - e.g. for the EU?  For NATO?  The West vis-à-vis China?   Etc etc.  Very much open to any insights and perspectives on this massive and rather important topic - lots of you [2] know Germany well.

ND 
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[1]  Frankfurt?!  Have you ever been there?  Would your wife be willing to live there?  Would anyone ever visit you there?
[2] OK, this quote is a bit out of context but Nietzsche very much saw the Germans as being suckers for falling in behind a Grand Idea, whether or not having serious merit.  He blamed Bismarck for using his undoubted statesmanship and populism to build up "a monstrosity of imperial power"; and I don't think he'd have liked what Merkel did either. 
[3] Am greatly missing whatever would have been Mark Wadsworth's opinions on this: he thought widely & laterally, and was an excellent German speaker.

Tuesday, 11 July 2023

Erdogan: the Transactional Turk

Erdogan has really excelled himself this time, the major obvious casualty of his machinations being Putin and his ever more flimsy stature & general political dignity.  Drones, Sweden, Azov, ... what is the full nature of the Turkish "trade package"?  Does he have it in writing (from Biden / Ukraine / NATO / EU)?  Or is he just positioning himself for a Cunning Plan he has in mind?

(1) Transactional politics has upsides - and downsides

As I've written before, in some political spheres - foreign policy generally being one of them - the 'lines of logistics' can be incredibly short: unlike most domestic policy-making, it can be stroke-of-a-pen stuff instead of months & years of hard, practical grind, with all the attendant implementational friction & risks of material long-term projects.  (Thus, to take one of a million examples, Lenin took Russia out of WW1 in a morning.)  Some politicians, indeed some human beings in general, heavily lean this way: there's no situation they won't try to deal their way out of (negative) or into (positive). 'Transactionality' is one facet of this type of approach: Sadiq Khan is perhaps the most prominent UK exponent right now.   

The upsides are clear.  A stroke of the pen requires far less blood-and-treasure to resolve a dispute than 'going to war' or its analogues, & gets quicker results, too.

The downsides are there, too.  Obviously, transactionalism appeals not least to politicians of the bone-idle tendency.  Ditto, the heavily-overlapping subset of politicians who have no principles or red lines whatever.

And what can be done at the stoke of a pen can be undone just as fast.  Sometimes, "with one bound he was free" clever-cleverness doesn't cut it: a fundamental solution is needed, the hard yards can't be dodged**.  To give a foreign-policy example:  what could be more convenient for NATO backsliders like Germany than a neat, stroke-of-a-pen "resolution" on Ukraine that would mean they didn't need to restore defence spending to prudent levels?  Very neat, yeah.

(2) Downside for Erdogan?  Oh yes there is

I'll give you at least one.  Turkey is essentially 100% dependent on Russia for gas (as well as a lot of oil).  It gets very cold there in winter.

Less obviously, since the economic recession Erdogan foisted on his country Turkey has been having the utmost difficulty in taking all the gas they've contractually committed to.  They owe Gazprom a bunch of money.  Thus far, it's been forgiven ... That's on top of a cold winter in Turkey.

Transactions, transactions.

ND

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** Also, the Clever Stroke often leaves a very nasty taste in the mouth:  in the Claudius novels, Graves writes of how on a particular campaign, Claudius engineered a lightning victory by having his men take the enemy camp at night by crawling up silently through the undergrowth, with total success.  The 'victorious' Roman troops hated it:  they wanted a proper conventional scrap in the morning.  Their triumph-by-subterfuge "smelled of the candle".  

Tuesday, 18 April 2023

German energy experiment lurches into new territory

At midnight on 15-16 of this month, Germany shut down its last nuclear power generation capacity - forever.  It was asked for one last hurrah over the winter (the Putin effect): but that's it now, despite dumb German politicians at the highest levels who seemed to think these things could just be switched on and off at will, and that actually we don't need fossil fuels or nukes at all.

Here's some dramatic irony.  For those that care about these things - and some people care a lot - the carbon intensity of the German power fleet on 15-16 April was 550 g/kWh**.  And what if Germany had maintained its nukes at the 2003 level, its peak in that country?  It would have been just 50 g/kWh, with no coal-, lignite-, gas- or oil-fired electricity required whatsoever on that day (peaking could have been provided by hydro and dispatchable biomass).  For comparison, the UK typically comes in at under 150g, having halved since 2012.  

So - as the usual suspects gear up to sue the EC for declaring nukes (and gas) to be "green", let them think on that 11-fold increase in carbon intensity which might, over-simplifying slightly, be attributed to the policy-driven closures of nukes in Germany.

Germany really is the poster-child for crass policy making across the spectrum, and it's unravelling at a rate of knots since Merkel headed off into the sunset.  I don't quite know where people get off on holding the country up as a model of rationality and consensus.  Good luck to them over the next few years, as they grapple with "new realities" for their energy, industrial, foreign and defence policies.  Not to mention the 1m+ refugees from the middle east.  Those Merkel memoirs will make for interesting reading.

ND

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** Was it perhaps a day with no wind?  No, there was a decent contribution from wind, ditto solar in the middle of the day.

Friday, 16 December 2022

Europeans Don't Understand Markets, Part 37

Not a new theme around here, but the examples keep rolling in.  Now it's the protracted attempt to enforce a "European gas price cap".  Even the ECB knows this one is crazy: and for once, the Germans (the usual butt of my scorn on this issue) are more-or-less on the side of the angels.

The idea is this.  Almost all the economic ills of Europe are the fault of high wholesale gas prices.  (Never mind that this ain't true: French electricity prices are even higher, caused by the chronic state of their ailing nuclear fleet.)  So: if we simply legislate to cap wholesale gas prices ... all our troubles are over - right?

Most of the wrangling is over what the magic number should be.  Too high, and "it has no effect".  Too low, and, errr, well hang on, what does "too low" mean?  We want it to be low!

This fighting over exact numbers is an entirely fatuous fracas because the whole idea is structurally bonkers, whatever the level of the "price cap".  How is it supposed to work?  Unlike its predecessor, the "electricity price cap" (which was in effect to be paid for by governments, via a cash subsidy whenever prices actually rose above the cap - like the UK's present "energy price guarantee"), this one is an outright ban on gas dealings above the capped level.  Dealing, that is, on the leading exchange platforms handling spot trade at the main European gas trading hub, the Dutch TTF.  On an automated basis, no deals would be accepted at prices above the cap.

So, errr, no gas for Europe then, if the TTF price goes too high?   That's the German worry; but actually, nope - trade would simply migrate to other forums: bilateral dealing or, whisper it softly, platforms not coming under the EC's jurisdiction (London, NY and Chicago come to mind).  Any problems with that?  Well, there's the question of clearing and credit support: but bear in mind that in the days of yore, almost all gas trades were bilateral - and there are viable (if clunky) means of instituting bilateral credit support.  They'll just need to dust off those old ISDA Master Swaps.

In their deep ignorance, Euro-politicians work themselves into fine frenzies over this stuff - and burn a great deal of precious midnight oil.  Presumably they're all on double-time, free meals and 5* hotels when they work after 4pm or something.  And when it goes predictably tits-up, they all look around in wonderment and call for an enquiry.  What is the point of these people?  

ND 

Friday, 11 November 2022

COP27: Contradictions Foretold

The other day I was looking back at the C@W "predictions 2022" compo.  En passant, it seems that back in January, none of us could believe Putin would actually invade ...

Anyhow, I offered "it's not a prediction, it's a cert; 2022 will be a year when the contradictions in energy policy will truly make themselves felt" - and now, as then, I claim no credit because it was already obvious for all to see.  You could argue - certainly in the case of Germany - it had been obvious for years.

Anyhow, fast-forward to COP27, and much blathering about the wicked oil and gas producers limbering up to produce ... more gas!  And - shock, horror

The push is coming from the host Egypt and its gas-producing allies amid a global energy crisis compounded by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Well yes.   And of course benighted Germany is well to the fore in stimulating the producers' revived development activity.  As the Grauniad callously puts it

Panic over keeping people warm in winters to come, and keeping the lights on from gas-fired power generation, has led governments in Europe that previously relied on gas from Russia to push for new supplies from a range of other sources.

Well, errr, yes again!  'Panic', of course, is a loaded term in progressive circles, generally coupled as "moral panic", which is always a thing to be derided.  That really is a nasty little insinuation.

Yup, gas it is.  Nature's most all-round effective off-the-shelf fuel offering, certainly in the context of today's technology - while we patiently await practicable nuclear fusion, and/or serious electricity storage capability.  What wailing and gnashing of teeth there will be if Egypt engineers a COP27 resolution which labels gas as "sustainable" ...

ND

Saturday, 29 October 2022

Winter draws on ...

 ... and we are in better shape than might have been the case, all things being considered.  Don Cox noted BTL that the Rough gas storage facility has started up again** - a very curious, nay, fishy 'miracle', as we've noted before - albeit at 20% of its former capacity: but every little helps.  Several UK coal plants have been revived, to be on standby in case the gas runs out and the wind doesn't blow.  And the Germans have moved mountains to get floating LNG receiving import facilities online, again with the caveat that the volumes won't be as great as all that.  They nearly made their ambitious gas storage inventory targets before going into winter, too.  They, also, have been busily reviving coal, and indeed lignite plants for reserve duty.  And they've done what I and others thought was probably not possible, in squeezing a few extra months out of the nukes that were set for closure.  This wasn't possible with Hinkley Point B in this country, despite government pleading and financial blandishments: HPB was closing (and has indeed closed, as of August) due to age and infirmity, whereas the German nukes were closing by political fiat.  That doesn't mean Scholtz will get any more months out of them next year, because the supporting infrastructure has been shutting down, too.

Several other EU nations, notably the Spanish, have been preparing very well, too.

On the supply-side downside, the French are again falling hugely short.  Their nuke fleet was staggering back to its feet for winter in a partial way, after extensive safety-related closures, only to be hit by a wave of strikes.  Well, there you go, Macron: it's a continuation of massive imports and the highest (wholesale) electricity prices in Europe for you, then. 

This is also proving very costly for Germany, too - but I always said nobody should bet against their ability to put their shoulders to the wheel.  You have to laugh when Macron throws a strop when it's announced by Germany that they are budgeting EUR 200 bn for their energy measures.  Merde! That will distort the European energy market!  Well what did he think:  the richest nation in Europe would volunteer to freeze, out of fellow-feeling for the Frogs?

Talking of distorting the market, France is also desperately trying to get the EC to introduce a "cap on wholesale gas prices" - whatever that might conceivably mean in a truly global gas market.  I won't bore everyone with my endless refrain that most European politicians don't understand how markets work.  I used to finger the Germans most specifically for this, but it now looks as though most of the top players in Scholz's government have taken some rapid lessons on this topic since February, and know the score a little better.  Tough titty, Macron - but you had it coming.

I only hope the new government here looks him squarely in the eye and tells him he can forget any hopes for Sizewell C he might have nurtured on behalf of the French équipe nucléaire; not on the terms he had in mind, anyhow.  We've had enough of PMs bowing the knee to EDF in these matters.

Hold tight for the coming winter.

ND

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** Anon asked:  anything to do with the cost of gas futures at the mo? And the implications for Russia / Middle East LPG. 

The forward market is in very strong contango at the moment (having been for months in backwardation, which some theorists say is impossible for a commodity like gas).  This betokens market sentiment that for right now (i.e. until really cold weather strikes) Europe is looking OK for gas supply - a function of all those efforts noted above - and that winter 2023-24 now looks to be the big problem, despite some some idiot political pundits saying the coming winter will be the last we need to worry about.  Fully-laden LNG tankers are stacked up off the Atlantic coasts of UK / France / Spain, effectively acting as floating storage.  So yes, Anon, Rough (and UK plc) is in a position to benefit from this current situation.  Rough, as you prob know, is 'seasonal' storage, i.e. designed only really for a single annual cycle of injection and withdrawal; and although there's plenty of volatility across the whole forward curve (which benefits such facilities) it pales into insignificance compared to the vol in the spot and short-dated markets, which benefits facilities with much shorter cycles (e.g. 1 or 2 months).  I hope (but rather doubt) that HMG allowed Centrica to get on with their 'Rough miracle' without public money; because Centrica has played a pretty shifty game on this. 

Whilst on the subject of storage economics: as you'd expect, owners of grid-scale batteries, limited though they are in capability, have been making a fortune for more than a year now: ditto owners of gas-fired peaking plants.  Vol is the main play in town, now that simply going long isn't a one-way bet any more.  For example, the current gas market contango will reverse in a matter of days if a Beast from the East hits (energy beast, that is - not Putin again).

Incidentally, the personal burnout in energy traders has to be seen to be believed.  Initially they were just making fortunes; but now liquidity and credit issues are bearing down on them, and they can drop $10m on a cargo of LNG as easily as make it, in the touch of a button.  Hairy times. 

Wednesday, 7 September 2022

Plans to "solve the energy crisis"

The EU and, we are assured, newly-minted PM Liz Truss, are hatching plans to cater for - I can't immediately think of a better phrase - the energy crisis this winter and maybe beyond.  Well, they certainly have to do something: "Devil take the hindmost" doesn't count as public policy (even if a handful of commenters seem to favour the bracing Nietzschean approach). 

Whatever these plans turn out to be in detail, by definition they will be epic in scope and scale.  In such extreme and complex circumstances, with so many moving parts, I don't trust any bureaucrat to do anything adroit; so we may be equally sure the "unintended consequences" will be monstrous.  We could all guess at a few.  Greta thinks she can guess, too - and she's not happy.

I particularly don't trust the EU in general, and Germany in particular, to do anything half-way intelligent by way of intervening in markets that are international (electricity, carbon) if not global (oil, gas, coal).    As opined here many times before, there is a profound shortfall in German understanding of how markets actually work, which is inevitably and amply reflected in Brussels.  

Come to that, the much-hyped G7 plan for a "cap on oil prices" also sounds cracked.

And do we trust Truss, to invoke a recent coinage?   

But of course we await details on all of this high-minded blundering; so perhaps we should calmly wait and watch, with equanimity and an open mind ...   

ND

Tuesday, 9 August 2022

Edging closer to winter 2022-23 in Europe

Neither Tory leadership candidate really wants to acknowledge what's coming down the line for Xmas.  They'd much prefer to trade upbeat, positive-sounding stuff.  Boris sure as Hell doesn't want it to be discussed: anything that goes tits-up will be the exclusive responsibility of Whomever Follows, because, hey, there was no delinquency on his watch.   The same reticence can be seen across Europe.  We mulled this over four weeks ago; but as I return from a short hol, evidently the prospects for winter still remain too scary for anyone to acknowledge in full detail.  I suppose we must credit Gordon Brown (not a man who ever got much credit from C@W, and who has much to atone for) for at least having a try.  Even he only talks about domestic energy bills, as if the energy itself is not at issue.  And what of the food?

At the time of writing, only Italy and Slovakia are receiving any Russian gas to speak of: supplies to Germany are down to a trickle.  The gas systems of Europe are so stressed and constipated as they try to replace this with 'reverse-flow' sources - LNG terminals to the west of Europe, pushing gas eastwards - that various technical limitations have been reached and there's even spare capacity at UK LNG terminals right now: the amount we can onward-export via cross-channel pipelines is maxxed out.  The UK, and even more so, Spain (which is similarly well-provided with LNG terminals, but really can't export much to France at all) are islands of 'low' (relatively low) wholesale gas prices.  Demand destruction looms across industrial Europe.  And it's a really hot summer!

(Speaking of which, hot weather sends electricity prices up, too ...)

Presumably, Putin is showing his hand, gas-wise, as early as this in order to give European politicians a low-impact (relatively low) demo of what's to come.   If, despite the inclinations of France / Italy / Hungary / many German businessmen towards an "accommodation", Europe actually has to wear this in winter 2022-23, the dynamics of world trade will be monumentally distorted.  To say nothing of the politics.  Ukraine may be planning a spectacular counter-offensive for the weeks to come, and China continues its firework display: but otherwise, all eyes are on Germany.  What will Scholz do?

ND 

Sunday, 19 June 2022

Shorting Germany?

Anon, BTL previous post - "any investment suggestions?" ... 

Well we can't and don't do financial advice or recommendations on this blog, so DYODD etc.

But here's something from Capx which is a clear enough recommendation from somebody else: buy dollars and Italy, sell Germany! 

Blast from the past: 2010
The rationale is basically that the Germans are about to cop the bill for the Mediterranean economies.  Hmmm - that's a bit like nuclear fusion, people have been predicting it for a long time.  But maybe now's the hour.  You can also chuck into the pot Germany at long last being called out / caught out as being the mainstay of the Russian economy (both as importer of stuff and exporter of tech), which may not be allowed to last much longer.  What other game do they have to play that could be equally lucrative?  Well, China, of course as regards the tech exports - but the USA won't let 'em have a free run at that, even if they've (the Germans) been surreptitiously sleeving, not to say laundering for Russia these 8 years.

Personally I went 'buy USD' when the whole current thing kicked off which I date to Feb 2021 (when I first reported far-east gas prices going through the roof here) - a general rule of mine over the decades.  He who underestimates the latent strength of the USA is often doomed to a big disappointment.  Saved me in the late '00's when I shorted GBP @ 2.10 in '07 (hat-tip CU, I might add: I can even tell you which pub we were in).  We tracked its glidepath down on the blog, all through the financial crisis.

Gold hasn't been quite as effective this time around.

How much further down can £ go?  Well 1.05 (1982) is the all-time low (That's what it says when I looked it up just now.  From memory, it actually went a bit lower that year).  The psychological floor represented by 1.00 is apparently quite sturdy.  That's not a prediction, by the way.

ND

Tuesday, 12 April 2022

Sanctions and their hard-to-judge effect

There's a very long history of financial sanctions.  Apartheid-era South Africa and Rhodesia suffered for years, but somehow got by (and a lot of oil traders got rich).   It can't have done them any good, though.   The West managed against OPEC in 1973-74, but hardly emerged unscathed.  Cuba also got by, but hardly thriving by the standards of the hemisphere where it lies.  North Korea gets by, after a fashion, and scrimps together enough surplus resources to mount a nuclear ballistic missile development programme.  Iran hasn't obviously been brought to its knees.  Most societies only really prosper with a basic level of efficiency in day-to-day commerce, import/export etc.  Undue friction eventually wears things down.  *Eventually*, however, is to be measured not in months, but in years or even decades.

So what will be the impact of sanctions on Russia? (- imperial Russia, that is: oligarchs will just have to mourn their yachts in private.)

On the one hand, we gather Putin laid in quite substantial foreign currency reserves (and gold?).  Russia is probably OK for food, and obviously awash with energy (Germany's perpetual strategic weakness).  It seems - and this is truly remarkable, even granted the well-known long-term demographics - they are short of manpower for the fray, drafting in Syrians, Chechens, and the assorted orcs and dregs of the mercenary world: but sanctions don't really affect that kind of import.  Equally astounding, it seems they are also short of military supplies; but China can make good, if minded to do so.

Where's the short term pressure-point, then?  Or even medium term?  The only compelling answer I've read is that Russian manufacturing - such as it is, i.e. not much to write home about** - is wholly dependent on western imports for vital higher-tech components, and will rapidly grind to a halt without them.  Where will this bite?  (a) They'll need to import more or less everything from China & India eventually; and (b) their efforts to open up more remote oil provinces will be stillborn.

(b) is an interesting one for the long strategic haul.  "Upper Volta with rockets" is the traditional insult, but more recently I've heard Russia pithily described as "the oil exporter that ran out of cheap oil".  Yes, exporting oil is just as important to Russia as gas - and a lot more flexible when it comes to dodging boycotts and embargos, as those Swiss-based oil traders will helpfully confirm.  But, they're coming to the end of the cheaply-produced reserves.  The next few decades depend on opening up some much more difficult oil patches, which will be beyond them (and probably China, too) - this is the province of prime US / UK expertise.

(a), however, bites a lot more quickly, and equates to the severing of Russia from the modern world.  Do they care?  Well, Putin probably has his populace where he wants them: either patriotically onside, or thoroughly suppressed - and with a near-infinite capacity for suffering privations, let it not be forgotten.  And there's always the China trade, energy-for-stuff.  Surely that's not even remotely satisfactory, for Putin or anyone else in Moscow?   But is it sufficiently intolerable to be a deadlock-breaker, via something like a putsch, or a resort by Russia to massive escalation? ++

I really don't know the answer.  Never a good idea to place too big a bet on who can hold their breath the longest.  But it seems we may be limbering up for a contest of that sort.

ND

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** Obviously, there are some areas of remarkable strength: I gather Russia's titanium industry is second to none.  But that's just a North Korea phenomenon.  Their trucks (for example) are utter crap: as related here before, when the Chinese were first in the market for gas, Russia tried to make them buy a bundled offering, gas + trucks.  The Chinese laughed in their faces.  Either gas on its own - and deeply discounted, too - or nothing, comrade! 

++ Which can surely only mean tactical nukes, which turns out to be the only military thing Russia still has that impresses anyone.  PS, I'm willing to bet most of them won't work, either, if it comes to it.  But you might only need a couple ... 

Sunday, 10 April 2022

Ukraine & Gas: What Germany Does Next ...

These are extraordinary times.  Some weeks ago I was finding it hard to believe German politicians really understood how their energy economy worked when they blithely approved their initial wave of 'anti-Russian' measures - rearming themselves, "suspending" Nord Stream 2, rowing back on decommissioning coal plants etc etc - and that Putin probably misjudged, i.e. badly underestimated, their ignorance, to his cost.   Even the economy minister, a Green, lined up behind the coal decision and initially thought they might be able to throw their nuclear closures programme into reverse.     

Well, his civil servants disabused him of that one in a hurry - and probably several others of his green fantasies, like *we don't really need fossil fuels at all*.  Before the Bucha footage hit the meejah, it all rather looked as though Germany and France were quietly backsliding towards self-interested appeasement of Putin.  National self interest: it's what politicians are for.

Then Bucha.  Now the cry goes up again: stop buying Russian coal (easy) / oil (bit more difficult) / gas (bloody difficult!).  Now obviously some of these cries are from quarters, e.g. USA, that would be little affected.  Others come from deeply ignorant greens on the one hand, and outright warmongers on the other - Guardian Newspaper, this means you.  (Probably well-represented in both categories, actually.)  But yet others seem to be from the German populace at large.  Initially their newly-educated politicians were in "Easy, tiger..." mode; but now the cry seems fairly widespread, and people are seriously asking: could Germany really do this?  Well, that's indeed a serious question on a serious subject: and some apparently intelligent people are saying 'yes'.

Here's where the difficulty starts when trying to figure out what's going on.  There is definitely a 'war' party, as well as an utterly naïve green faction, but let's put them to one side.  Do the apparently more sober boycott advocates mean:

  1. ... but we know it'll be very difficult, to be phased over 3-4 years  - ?
  2.  Do it now: we know it'll be catastrophic for the German economy & people, but it's a price we must pay  - ?
  3.  Do it now: we think there are clever ways of doing this, albeit at some cost, but no worse than (e.g.) covid lockdown or re-unification of East Germany  - ?
There are probably folks to be found in each category.  For what it's worth, my assessment of these three lines is as follows.

1.  Yes, even 3-4 years won't be at all cost-free, neither for Germany nor for its EU brethren (nor indeed us in the UK, as gas prices will soar).  But yes, at that cost, it's doable.  PS, Germany had better look out for the interests of several other EU countries, for whom the hit may be worse.  They'll certainly be invited to pay up in support, via some euro-mechanism or other.

2.  'Catastrophic' is putting it mildly for the outcome of turning off the Russian gas prior to next winter.  And in the longer term, as noted here before, Germany's natural energy resources beyond coal & lignite are very meagre - not a fraction of the wind potential that we enjoy, and not much sun to speak of.  Plus, of course, Merkel purposefully omitted to build any LNG import infrastructure, as we've noted oft before.

3.  Of course one should always be as clever as possible; and maybe my imagination is lacking: but I can't see anything other than some really obvious, and somewhat limited mitigants for the pain, certainly if next winter is cold, but also economic pain extending many more years than the covid-related hit.

Can Germany take such a hit?  Can we?  Well, "there's a great deal of ruin in a nation", as the EU clearly forgot when it came to Brexit, assuming as they did that the UK couldn't do anything other than roll over.  But, of course, it applies symmetrically to Russia, which may be able to manage with even heavy sanctions for quite a while: (they outlasted Hitler, didn't they?) - a topic we'll return to next week.

If indeed Germany does propose to don a genuinely painful hairshirt in defence of Ukraine, the internal consequences will be extremely severe, and lasting.  And the knock-on won't be a joke either - particularly for Eastern Europe (except, ahem, Hungary ... unless Germany takes steps to block them off, too) but without doubt hurting everyone else in Europe, including ourselves.  For us, it will mostly be via price, as everyone bids into a much diminished gas supply, which can't leak out via cargo-laundering as oil can.  But the price pain will be quite bad enough.

Later next week, we'll turn to how things would play out in Russia following a doomsday oil & gas boycott.

ND

Monday, 28 March 2022

'Germans Don't Understand Markets', part 94

From time to time I am moved to observe that Germans, as a rule, have no intuitive grasp of how markets work.  Perhaps their postwar social-democrat / Christian democrat tradition is so inherently mercantilist and dirigiste (and, by many lights, successful!) and now so deeply ingrained, that market dynamics pass them by.

At the state level the French 'Enarchists' aren't much better (though you meet far more French business people who know the score).  So there's little hope that 2022 Brussels, with no leavening of UK influence, will have the first clue.  Here's some up-to-date evidence.  

EU leaders pledged to bulk buy natural gas jointly and review the role of the fuel in setting electricity prices as part of plans to protect European consumers from spiralling energy costs ... “Instead of outbidding each other and driving prices up we will pool our purchasing power,” said Ursula von der Leyen

Where to start?  We all know where bulk buying and large-scale procurement by state entities leads, and it ain't prone to driving down prices++.  (It is prone to monstrous corruption: the mysterious middlemen who will insert themselves in this process when the politicians realise they are totally in the dark in such technical matters, will ensure an extra € or two gets added to the unit price, and is silently shared around a bunch of deeply undeserving individuals.  (Libel laws forbid me elaborating, but suffice to say the gas sector has not proved in any way immune from this in the state monopoly days of yore.)  It's just one of those things that can be made to 'sound sensible', sort-of, and is promoted by people like Peter Mandelson who has advocated it in the past.  But experience tells heavily against it.

The one that really amuses me is "review the role of the fuel in setting electricity prices".  Boris - another ignorant prick - has mouthed similar words.  Well, review away, fellahs; but I can tell you in a couple of sentences what the answer is.  The price of any traded commodity** is set by the cost (or opportunity-cost) of the marginal source of supply (or demand, in some cases), which for most of the time in European electricity is NATURAL GAS.  Occasionally it is something a bit more obscure and we get negative prices (something else that has always puzzled German politicians).  But the dynamics are exactly the same.

Gottit, Ursula?  Great: so you can save that million € being asked for by McKinsey or whomever to answer the question for you.  All part of the C@W service.

By the way, this situation is destined to prevail for many years - in fact, decades, as far as anyone can see - however much new 'renewable' electricity capacity is brought on line.  The only truly 'dispatchable' renewable source is hydro from reservoirs (as opposed to run-of-river).   In practice, biomass can be, too (if it isn't already running baseload because of the vast subsidies involved) - but large-scale biomass ain't renewable: its deemed renewable status is a massive scam.

Of course, Ursula's oh-so-predictable follow-up question is: what can we do about it?   Ans:  well, you can suspend the laws of gravity for just so long as you are willing to throw money at it.  But that's what happens:  you waste even more money, and it still comes out the same when, eventually, you've had enough.   Gottit?   Well no, sadly; probably not.

ND

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++ presumably, as dearieme has wittily observed BTL, "in homage to their success in buying vaccines jointly"  

** the physical commodity, that is.  Forward prices are set by completely different dynamics.

Thursday, 10 March 2022

EU: Federasts Gleefully Jumping on Crisis

The say the EC is full of devious people always waiting for opportunities to offer the unchanging panacea:  "the solution is more Europe, not less Europe!"   And what better opportunity than a full-blown crise?  In fact I seem to recall some proto-federast opining, donkeys years ago: Europe grows, crisis by crisis.  Never let a good one go to waste, eh?

Well they're gleefully jumping all over this one, n'est-ce pas?   Budgetary restraints out of the window; joint militaristic measures;  getting Germany to pay for everything, ... and I'm sure they have a big wish-list of other stuff they'll take the occasion to get through, by ramrod or stealth.

Makes you more glad than ever to be out of it, no?

Incidentally, they'll be watching the highly effective US/UK intelligence effort with much envy.  Couldn't you guys, errrr, let us in on that?  Please ...?

 ND

Thursday, 23 December 2021

Mr P's bold gamble -but what is it?

Very expensive business keeping 100,000 troops on station and ready to go. Let alone prepare an area with bridging equipment, tanks and all the logistical supplies needed for a war. Sooner or late the treasury will start weeping at these costs and the men will want to go home to see their families. 

Mr Putin has been playing this game for months though, Troops positioned to both expand Crimea to attach to a Greater Russia and conquer the Donbass region with its big cities and heavy industry. More worryingly, the maskirovka is in full swing  - stories of the CIA prepping chemical weapons in Ukraine for example. 

The price would be high though, Ukraine will fight on home territory, they don't much like the Russians and the russian troops - who knows how they will do, many are just conscripts. Russian equipment is both good on paper and poor in performance. 

But the West will not defend Ukraine. Some sanctions yes, severe ones even, but Germany still need Russia's gas. Mr P is currently turning this on an off in a display of his power. How Merkel, so lauded like Obama, has left a gaping strategic wound. 

Can Europe survive without Russian gas? In the short term, no, not without power cuts which will visit the UK too. In the long term yes. Plenty in the tank of Uncle Sam that can be shipped (at a price!) to Europe in a war-footing scenario. Equally though, the yanks might let Europe squirm a bit, having told Germany not to do this for decades, they will be very keen on an 'I told you so' moment. 

For Mr P, the upside is an odd one. yes an expanded Russia but international oblivion for 20 years. Long-term, less dependency on her gas which is the only valuable product they have. Maybe he plans to sell it all to China, who are less concerned about CO2 emissions anyway. 

Maybe it is all an elaborate ruse to get Ukraine to say it will never sign up to Nato and to get Nord-Stream2 approved which will in turn impoverish Ukraine suitably. 

But the troops are there now, the stand-off has a time limit. 

Monday, 16 August 2021

Nation-building: Blame The Germans

No apologies for returning to Afghanistan on a day like this.  Over the weekend I was chatting to a diplomat who offered the following suggestion.

After 9/11 the US was all for a crash-bang-wallop intervention in Afghanistan to nail OSB, nothing more.  This is indeed how it started: US + UK special forces, linking up with the Northern Warlords.  The shellshock induced in the whole world by 9/11 (Putin was giving a lot of help, and Pakistan could be leaned upon heavily) meant that a lightning campaign was eminently plausible.

Enter the Germans, with the enticing prospect that it could become a NATO mission ... but their price was the Liberal Meddler Overseas Agenda: schools for girls etc etc  Despite his own Defense establishment's opposition, somehow Bush Jnr swallowed this - and thus it became Policy.

So there's a thought.

There are plenty of liberals / progressives (and Paul Mason) wringing their hands over the thwarting of this agenda as I write, even as they despise the USA and (most of) its works.  Well, maybe in 2001 they all swallowed the End of History yarn, and thought America could impose anything on anyone.

ND

UPDATE: 

' “Saving women” was the reason so many of us backed the invasion'
Polly Toynbee, of course.

[1] it would probably have included Trans Rights today

[2] perhaps dreaming to go one better than his father's epic Coalition during Gulf War One (see this lengthy thread)

Wednesday, 17 February 2021

Fun and Games with Hydrogen in ... Germany

The whole hydrogen thing is very interesting in loads of dimensions.  We've debated several of them, above and below the line, in a number of posts over the past several months, this one being quite recent.

For present purposes, some definitions:

  • 'Grey' hydrogen is what almost all past and current industrial hydrogen has been: manufactured essentially from unabated fossil fuels, = lots of CO2 as a by-product
  • 'Blue' H is currently a fanatsy - manufactured, more-or-less conventionally or with some newer technologies, from natural gas AND with the resultant CO2 sequestered
  • 'Green' H is currently uneconomic - manufactured from water by electrolysis: no CO2 at all
  • I won't detain you with 'Turquoise' H (sic

As noted before, the gas industries of the world, petrified by the prospect of asset stranding on an humungous scale, are piling - with deadly serious intent - into hydrogen as their putative saviour, thinking that (a) in many cases it can utilise their existing infrastructure downstream (distribution, storage); (b) it plays readily to their existing engineering skills; (c) everyone loves them for it; (d) in due course there will be some subsidy-dosh on offer; (e) whisper it quietly, but while we are waiting for Green H to become a serious economic proposition, there might be a big role for Blue, or even ...Grey! 

Which brings us to Germany, our old friends with the fine words, *noble aspirations*, and demented policies.  They are dead keen to be at the forefront of the H-revolution, and are Absolutely Adamant it must be Green H and nothing else.  They have also been solemnly told by their scentific advisers (a panel of government and industry types) that there is no way in Hell that there will be economic Green H possible by 2030**.  But they don't want to be sitting on the sidelines while the pragmatic Brits get started with Grey (as we are doing already) and Blue.  So ... "we may have to import it to get started".  Hahahah!

And where might it come from?  And might it be, errrr, Grey? 

Germany in talks with Russia over hydrogen importsbut coy about 'colour' (RechargeNews). Germany is in talks about the import of “CO2-neutral” hydrogen from Russia, energy minister Peter Altmaier said during a virtual conference on bilateral relations. The minister was, however, unclear whether discussions concerned imports of green hydrogen produced via electrolysis from renewable electricity, or blue hydrogen from natural gas linked to carbon capture and storage (CCS) from a nation that is already Germany's biggest gas supplier.  

Yup, I think we may be sure that'll be a deep shade of Grey.  If not, *ahem*, Red ...  Did CU mention schadenfreude?

ND

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** They may be wrong about that: the technology is really motoring