Trump and Putin: making up war aims on the fly

You don't need to be a second Clausewitz to know that wars of choice should have well-defined goals before even the planning gets underway, let alone the execution[1].  In saying this, nobody is advocating total inflexibility thereafter; but to launch a war without proper goals at the outset is just buccaneering adventurism.

It's a commonplace observation that Trump hasn't a clue what he's doing in the Middle East, beyond representing a vague, atavistic American fixation with Iran, and harbouring a ludicrously and dangerously false equation between Venezuela 2026 and Iran 2026.  To the extent he sometimes feels the urge to state one or more war aims, he's issued so many over the hours, days and weeks that it merely goes to reinforce his brainlessness.  (To its credit, the intelligentsia in the USA is gradually shaking off its paralysis of 2025 and is ready to call him out in scathing detail -  see this from the estimable Ryan Evans.)  Already we can offer his Iranian adventure as a perfect illustration of the principle given above: and we haven't remotely seen the full downside potential yet.

But there's another perfect illustration bubbling away somewhere north of Iran, where Putin still conducts his own ill-conceived war on Ukraine.

At the very outset, he articulated two war aims, plus a long list of gripes and grievances.  They were: (A) to "de-Nazify" Ukraine's body politic; and (B) to "demilitarise Ukraine".  In the same announcement he declared he had no territorial claims on Ukraine (sic), although it's fair to note that at the same time he was asserting that Luhansk and Donetsk were independent countries.  And of course he assumed that after his lightning war, there would be a puppet regime in Kyiv, Belarus-style, that would render territorial conquest irrelevant.

[In the runup to the "special military operation" (which was "defensive, in aid of Luhansk and Donetsk"), he had of course demanded that NATO and the EU shun Ukraine, and that the former must withdraw to pre-accession borders.  But those were hardly war aims: he hoped they'd fall into his lap at the negotiating table when Ukraine was, errr, defeated.]

Given A and B above, manifestly he has completely and utterly failed even by his own lights; and everyone in Russia knows it.  There has been no regime change in Kyiv, whatever childish political label he wants to attach to it.  And demilitarisation?  Pound for pound, Ukraine now has the best army in the world, a thriving defence industry, world-leading expertise in drone warfare, etc etc; and is reducing a vastly larger force to ruinously costly advances through unimportant hamlets at snail's pace.   Oh yes, and on the other side of the front line it is degrading Russia's mighty energy industry to a material degree; periodically grounding its civil air movements; blocking its ports; sinking its ships; and (in conjunction with sanctions) hobbling its economy.   

Here's where it gets interesting for the theme of this post.  Reports from fairly reliable Russian sources suggest Putin is under tremendous internal political pressure to find an off-ramp before the economy nosedives.  Those oligarchs still have some sway, if they conduct themselves cautiously.  One major thrust of this exercise[2] is to come up with some - wait for it - War Aims, such as can plausibly be declared duly accomplished.  Then it's "home for tea and medals" as we say in the British Army.

What, then, do we imagine his newly-forged war aims will be?  It's a serious question, notwithstanding  that sarcastic suggestions come quickly to mind.  

We'll take both kinds BTL - let's see what we can come up with to help L'il Volodya with Project "Absolute Victory26".

ND 

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[1] Long-time readers will know I often laud George HW Bush (Bush Snr) for his adherence to this principle when setting out to evict Saddam from Kuwait, 1990-91.  More on that conflict by following the 'Kuwait' and 'Saddam' tags on that post.

[2] Another is to keep plugging away at Trump, trying to persuade him that utter Ukrainian defeat is just around the corner, so why not tell Zelensky to surrender?  Yeah, right.  I have a feeling the moment for this gambit has passed.

Desert Storm (8) - the Halt on the Road to Baghdad

30 years ago, the Coalition had eventually launched its ground offensive to expel Saddam from Kuwait, having used the many months of planning-time well.  The huge and (in its better units) capable Iraqi army was well dug-in, and as ever, had devised some genuinely innovative defensive tactics.  Particularly creative and noteworthy was the digging of a system of forward trenches fed directly by Kuwaiti oil wells: at the opening of a valve, the trenches could be flooded with crude oil and set on fire, creating a genuine obstacle as well as a tremendous smokescreen, that staple of tactics since WW2.

But notwithstanding the solid core of battle-hardened units, stiffened by the highly committed Republican Guard, much of their army was bulked out by raw, ill-trained conscripts of low morale.  The whole force had been degraded by weeks of exceptionally vigorous air attack.  And everything out in the open was fully reconnoitred in detail, with nowhere to hide.  The Coalition had a plan for everything they saw in front of them.  In "the biggest tank battle since Kursk", wherever the front line Iraqi units were not swiftly and remorselessly crushed (in some cases, literally) by the well-planned ground offensive, they typically showed a willingness to fight only for an hour or so, then surrender.  The number of willing prisoners, and speed of overall enemy collapse, surprised the already confident Coalition forces, who nonetheless had the leadership and logistical wherewithal to capitalise on it and steam ahead.  You can can easily find plenty of fulsome further reading material online.

It's pretty well known that massacres happen during rout, when an army turns its back and flees.  This is exactly what occurred at the end.  The Iraqi rabble that evacuated its newly-annexed Kuwaiti territory and fled north to Basra was caught in the open and, for a few hours, mercilessly strafed.  The result was predictable carnage and I'm choosing not to rehash some of the truly gruesome "Highway of Death" photos that adorned newspaper front pages the next day.  (Wiki doesn't, either.)

We've discussed before the vulnerability to air attack of vehicle columns, not least in the context of equally famous photos of what the Israelis periodically used to inflict, particularly on the Syrians who must be unusually bad at convoy discipline.  To be fair, it's not easy at the best of times - and in the desert, pretty damned impossible.  The only thing to do is break the convoy into packets of 5-6 vehicles, which ain't gonna happen in a rout.  The Germans in WW2 were the acknowledged masters of vehicular discipline in conditions of zero air cover, particularly in Italy: but (a) Italy isn't quite such hopeless terrain for the job, and (b) which other army has ever had the discipline of the Germans?  (I was once leading a packet that was part of a gigantic RAF convoy on exercise in Germany, supposedly being conducted under wartime "tactical" conditions, and the whole thing was an hilarious farce - subject of a story for another day.)

A day later, President Bush (Snr) called a halt to the Coalition advance into Iraq, a long way short of Baghdad.  Some say the carnage played a part in his decision.  There was much hoo-hah about this:  why didn't he allow Schwarzkopf to finish the job?  Or at least spend another 24 hours degrading Saddam's military capabilities still further?   (Given that politically this hoo-hah may be said to have led to Bush Jnr's crazy essay at Gulf War 2 the following decade, it's a fair question, and an interesting, multi-dimensional strategic counterfactual to mull over.)  

But Schwarzkopf, true soldier-of-a-democracy that he was, obeyed the political instruction to halt without demur.  All credit - massive credit - to both men, I always say.  For months, Bush had stayed out of real-time military meddling, which many another president wouldn't have been able to resist.  (Hitler never could.)  But Bush was always on the ball: and at the end, he was crisply decisive.  The military respected the ultimate political authority.  That's the way the bargain should work in a democracy at war.

We'll look at what happened next in another episode.  

ND

George Bush Snr: The Departing of a Wise President

George Bush Snr, 41st President, was a man who truly knew how to conduct both himself and the affairs of state.  From a solid war record in WW2 (unlike the confected Kennedy account) he clearly formed some suitably mature views on how the military should operate in a western democracy - a rather important qualification for an elected president of the world's most powerful nation - and his oversight of the First Gulf War 1990-91 was a perfect exemplar. 

First, the politicians should set the goals and, most critically, the constraints.  Then, they must leave the military to get on with it.  (Not without ongoing review and supervision, obviously - devising grand strategy is an interative process between soldiers and state.  Not least, the military perennially need to ask for more resources.)  In particular, when the fighting starts, the politicians step right back from the action, notwithstanding the agonising temptation to call the shots blow-by-blow.

Even back in the 60's, telecommunications were good enough for Lyndon Johnson to interfere daily from his desk in Vietnam.  By 1990, they were very much better.  (We were able, for example, to give near real-time notice of Scud launches and a fairly accurate prediction of their ballistic trajectory, which appeared immediately on Scud-alert screens anywhere in the world.  We could then watch them landing at their predicted point of impact.  All from the comfort of a desk.)  Just think of the scope that gave for minute-by-minute meddling: the sheer temptation.

But Bush knew better, and left the military to it.  (By the way, so did John Major.  I can't speak for what Thatcher would have done had she remained in power - someone who saw her in action during the Falklands may be able to take a guess.  But I didn't: and the comms were very much better by 1990, so the temptations were greater.)  

And when the coalition forces stormed through Kuwait and reached the prescribed stop-lines ... they stopped, despite it being a rout.

We can argue forever what would have happened if the remnants of the Republican Guard had been pursued to Baghdad.  For what it's worth, Schwartzkopf's main regret was not that hot pursuit wasn't allowed: he absolutely respected the political decision.  He just wished he'd had the imagination to force Saddam to surrender in person.

Farewell George HW Bush.  One of the very last and best of the Great Generation.

ND