Enron's plan for property-price derivatives market

Canary Wharf: cornerstone 

Following on from the post about the 'predictions market' & how various attempts to make financial markets in superficially prospective areas have sometimes come unstuck (water; bandwidth, weather): I'd mentioned that just before the Big Collapse, Enron was planning a property-price derivatives market, meaning futures / forwards at the outset, and ultimately options.

The rationale for there being demand for such a thing was this.  Many individual and commercial entities, as well as outright investors, can find they have a lot at stake as regards the variability over time of property prices in general, and the differences between property prices in different regions (technically, a source of 'basis risk').  Simple examples at the personal level: someone who hasn't yet sold their current property but has committed to buying a new one - needs a hedge against prices dropping while they find a buyer.  Someone who needs to move from London to Manchester for a couple of years but expects to return to London thereafter: needs a hedge against London prices outstripping Manchester over that period.  Someone who wants to lock in an attractive price they've seen the identical house next door fetching when it sold last week, but doesn't plan to move just yet: needs a hedge against local prices falling.  Etc etc etc.  

And of course once a market is established, speculators and punters can pile in: unlike weather (see previous post), people often really do have strong opinions about whether the property market is overheated or underpriced.

So how was Enron going to get the show on the road, back in 2001 at the time of the Collapse?  They put some of their best people on it.  Regionally specific price indices already existed - the sine qua non for derivatives.  Key to any market is liquidity, in turn requiring market makers and critical mass: and, with some aspects of derivatives, the ability to cash out into the physical.  They had a strong relationship with the Halifax (then a big property player and publisher of indices) and planned to start with the London commercial (office space) sector - and to ensure physical delivery, as an opening gambit they were going to buy Canary Wharf !

Sadly, we will never know how this would have panned out ...

ND

Volatility rules!

VOLATILITY is a bit of a speciality of mine.  When natural gas was first traded, that was in the teeth of assertions from certain no-nothing economists, purely on fallacious a priori grounds, that gas was a "paradigm case" of a commodity that could not be traded.  The market price routinely exhibited vol that was unparalleled for a liquid traded asset (barring the odd rogue stock), and the economists crowed: there you go, this is set for crash-and-burn.  But as the market matured, and was self-evidently not crashing / burning, and the vol persisted ... it became apparent that it was a feature, not a bug, for which reasons can be adduced.  The maths of gas market price-formation and vol was quickly established, and everyone with a stomach for roller-coasters settled down to enjoy the ride.

When electricity was first traded, well, that was considered  even more deeply impossible by the aforesaid eejits.  And electricity prices manifest vol that was completely off the scale - some three orders of magnitude higher than previously encountered anywhere (except nat gas - just one to two orders higher).  And the maths of elec price formation proved much more difficult to establish.  But established it was, and off we went.

It is first-hand experience of all this that informs what follows.

1.  Volatility is like heartbeat, or (switching idioms) friction.  No heartbeat = no life.  No friction = no traction.  But too high a heartbeat, and you're also looking at death.  Too much friction, and you are looking at everything grinding to a halt.

2.  Some folks benefit from vol:

(a) those who've placed market bets on vol, which is fairly easy to do if you understand financial derivatives.  Easiest of all, for stocks & shares there is the "fear index", a.k.a the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX).  Needless to say, this is riding high right now.

More generally, for those to whom these terms are familiar, you can put on long calls and an equal number of long puts, with the strike-price either at, or either side of, the current price (depending on your precise strategy and how much premium you are willing to pay).

(b) those who've invested in 'flexibility' assets, a.k.a optionality in the financial jargon; e.g. (in my neck of the woods) a flexible oil refinery (which can benefit from volatility in the prices of crude oil and finished products); a flexible gas-fired power station (prices of gas, power and carbon); a flexible gas storage facility or electricity battery (prices of gas / elec now, and forward prices of gas / elec for forward time periods; a flexible power interconnector (prices of elec here, and over there) etc etc etc.  As vol goes up, the value of your option-asset goes up.  As Black & Scholes proved, in their Nobel-prize-winning work, vol is a primary component of option value.

 3.  For everyone else, high vol, like high friction, is unequivocally a cost.  And eventually, when we reach the upper end of the heartbeat / friction spectrum it weighs on everyone.  The cry of "risk off" goes up, and big players withdraw from the market, at which point another critical variable - liquidity - starts to loom very large.  There are b-a-d things down that path, too.  Don't let the know-nothing optimists tell you this is all for the best in a funny sort of way.  It ain't.  It's unequivocally bad.

Much more of Trump's casual lunacy and I think that end is in sight.

ND

Hedging for Whingeing Farmers - part 2

Some valuable practical detail in BTL comments after that last post - very much what I had in mind when writing "very real practical complexities around our simplified account above - which might have made for a genuinely interesting & informative Countryside piece."  Let's take a look at the issues they raised, & some more that I'm chucking in for good measure.

1.  The ability to hedge, even in principle.  (A) Scale.  Jim has suggested the threshold for being able to get into grain futures is 10,000 acres.  There will always be a lower limit (although with spread betting and ETF, that's been getting lower and lower) and certainly I have no better data.  And why shouldn't there be a minimum size / critical mass for any particular viable line of business?  We scorn the pitifully small energy suppliers (well, I do) for their lack of capitalisation, and wonder WTF they got a supply licence from Ofgem in the first place.  Why shouldn't some industries be for the competent Big Boys?  Nobody has a God-given right to set up a "craft" blast furnace just because they fancy.   

1(B).  Credit.  - maybe thought of as an aspect of 1(A), but it's a distinct issue.  It's always the case that a non-creditworthy counterparty (however large) can't get an OTC forward contract.  That's because payment may become due either way, & maybe they ain't good for the potential monies due.  Of course, if you're trading on an exchange (futures), you'll need to put up collateral and pay ongoing margin (if your position is moving out of the money) to minimise the credit risk.  That again may exclude some players if they can't put up the table money.  Again - so what?   

2.  Weather.  As raised by a couple of you.  Yep, this is one of the 'operational risks' that actually has little directly to do with hedging the financial exposures involved (though see 3. below on volume & Basis).  Weather risk will impact on farmers irrespective of market risk - it can impact adversely on timing, quantity and quality.  There was a time, in the late '90s / early '00s, when lots of people believed a big market was going to develop that would offer 'weather derivatives', there seemingly being a vast potential range of applications for such products.  It never really took off (for reasons we might discuss in another post), despite many big players putting in a lot of time, money, people & effort go get it going.  So:  as was mentioned BTL, insurance always was, and remains, the first recourse.  

Insurance, BTW, should always be anyone's fallback if they can't get a satisfactory hedge - and not just for weather, and not just for farmers .  No credit issues, except that naturally you need to be able to afford the premium upfront.  I say 'no issues' but of course as the client, you always have concerns over the creditworthiness of the insurance provider.  it's a heavily regulated sector, for that reason.

3.  Volume.  (Also mentioned BTL.)  Being subject to several unknowns - weather being perhaps the biggest - how does the farmer know exactly how much by volume to be trying to hedge?  This volumetric uncertainty is an intrinsic feature of some sectors, while virtually unknown in others.  The answer, as far as it goes, is easy:  pick a sensible, maybe conservative estimate, and hedge that.  You're then exposed on the balance, be that long or short.  Coupled with weather insurance, it's the best you can do.

4.  'Basis Risk' generally.  In markets where volumetric risk is small (& hence not requiring a whole risk-management discipline of its own), it would be viewed as a subset of the more general category of 'Basis Risk' - where there's an element of exposure remaining even when you've hedged the best that anyone can.  It can arise from a heap of different factors impacting the 'basis' of your hedge vs the basis of your own situation, e.g.:

-  the forward / futures contracts are only traded in lot sizes that don't allow you to create a perfect volume match;

- the settlement of the traded forward / futures is at a location and/or date that doesn't perfectly match your own locational / timing situation;

- the settlement is for a quality or grade of product that doesn't perfectly match that of your own product (e.g. a very special grade of oil for which there is no specific forward contract).  

That last point - quality - was indeed specifically raised in the Countryfile prog - about the only interesting thing that was aired.  They said that weather could affect what type of grain the crop would turn into, in terms of how it would be viewed - and priced - in the market.  I hadn't known that, but it makes perfect sense. 

*   *   *   *   *

To my mind the Countryfile team should have been at least mentioning some of the above, just as they very fairly (and in an easily-understood manner) alluded to the Basis risk of the quality uncertainty.  It's the job of TV to make these things accessible, and the whole of it is no more difficult than the quality point.

Finally, though, we get to Sobers' really interesting - and quite technical - comment that, courtesy of outrageous hanky-panky on the part of the hedge-providers, for the farmer to enter a forward / futures contract they are in practice writing a naked option.  If that terminology doesn't mean anything to you, well (a) I think Sobers explained the essence of the problem well enough, in lay terms; and (b) writing a naked option is about the most dangerous thing you can do in financial trading.

As many of you will know, agriculture isn't my sector.  I've already noted that small players needn't expect to find things just as they'd like them in any sector, so maybe this is really just another manifestation of 'too small'.  That said, to me it's a pretty shocking matter when, within an industry where quality matters so much, there aren't objective standards and assays that can be relied upon for both parties.   The whole of trade finance depends on it.  WTF should agriculture be different to energy, or metals, or pharma?  Yes, fraud happens in any industry, but what Sobers reports is daylight robbery & very depressing.  Is it really a problem for bigger farmers?  In principle there would, IMHO, be a huge opportunity for large, honest players to step into this situation charging a very modest premium for a proper service.

ND 

The BBC & the whingeing farmers of Countryfile

Hansen & partner: disingenuous whinge

The Beeb: everybody has their favourite gripe but where to begin?  From down on the farm at the highly regarded Countryfile, here's just a little straw in the wind.     

Adam Henson is one of their primary reporters, and evidently a genuine (and seemingly prosperous) farmer to boot.  So a couple of episodes ago, he's discussing with his "business partner" the generic farmers' problem of money, that vital perennial crop.  Here's what the two of them say (20:12 mins in):

"The trouble with grain is, it's a world commodity price ... we don't determine the price at all ...  Geo-political factors like the war in Ukraine ... Fertilizer costs ... Volatility ... A change in market price can cost us thousands ... It's pretty scary, really.  We've spent all the money, we've got a reasonable crop here ... when we decide what to grow, we're gambling on what each crop will be worth come harvest time ..." 

Oo-err, missus, sounds really scary.  Volatility!  War in Ukraine!  Changes in global market price!!   You'd never guess that this has been the farmers' oldest problem for millennia - and, equally, has been solved for a very long time indeed.  

For those unfamiliar with the basic principles of hedging and financial derivatives: whenever a player takes a fixed-price forward position (here a farmer, investing in seed etc at fixed cost today, but effectively playing in the forward cereal market against delivery at harvest time) in a market where prices are liable to change, that player is exposed to potential adverse movements in price.  They are of course simultaneously exposed to the upside of potentially favourable price movements; but it's the downside risk that mostly concerns us (and, seemingly, Henson) here.

Is this exposure necessary?  Not for a very long time, since the ages-old development of forward markets:  why doesn't Henson avail himself of the forward market for the cereal he's investing in?  In other words, forward-sell all (or at least a large part of) his crop at the very same time he buys his seed?  Putting matters simply (we'll note some complexities later), one generally assumes that at the time of his making the fateful decision, there must be a positive margin available to him, i.e. between his fixed costs and the forward value of the crop - else why is he even considering it?  So, courtesy of forward prices, that margin is there to be locked in, eliminating first-order Price Risk.  Now, his risk profile is mostly that of the operational risks associated with weather, blight etc - the very stuff of farming, even for a player bewildered by the financial markets.

Does Hansen not know this?   I think he must.  So why does he bleat in such a dumb fashion?  More to the point (since farmers always whinge & we all know this), why don't BBC editors intervene, & make him say something more comprehensive & honest?

Later in the week we'll take a look at some of the very real practical complexities around our simplified account above - which might have made for a genuinely interesting & informative Countryside piece.  But for now, let's notice how Hansen and his mate signed off.

"as a fairly large farm, we can afford to take some gambles ... "

And there we have it - the pair are gamblers! - which is the proper term for anyone with a forward-price exposure and the ability to hedge, but who doesn't in fact avail himself of the hedge.  Next time: how some of these issues play out in the Real World.

ND

Property: Bubbles, Bursting Bubbles and Better Markets

 
Real estate is clearly the topic du jour, if not du siècle, seeing as how the whole economy is endlessly to be pumped up like an old tyre with property inflation.

Now here's a thing, spotted by Timmy.  One of the new Nobel laureates, Robert Shiller, is an efficient markets theorist and Shiller, says our Tim,

"is certain that the housing crash was caused by not enough speculation, not too much. If there had been a futures market in housing, the ability to sell short, then the bubble would never have grown so big."

How so ?  Well, because derivatives would enable investors to go short, which is what is needed to correct a price ramp driven by long-only forces.  In the absence of a user-friendly derivatives contract, only heavy-duty professionals can conduct shorting operations, and even they may find it difficult to create the instrument they need synthetically or by proxy.  Some, we know, consider shorting as the work of the devil but they are wrong (see this exchange dating way back): the problems come when shorting is not available to all.  Markets need long/short symmetry to work efficiently.

In fact, lots of people could make use of a deep, tight-spread property derivatives market - and not just speculators (though they are ultra-important providers of liquidity):

• the house owner who needs to move elsewhere for a year: if he sells in order to be able to rent, he loses his position in the housing equity market and, if there is inflation, may find it difficult to re-enter at the same level.  But he can't afford the rent without selling; and doesn't want the hassle of letting his current property.  He needs a property-value forward contract (if he is content to be fully hedged), or an option (if he wants to retain the upside and is willing to pay the option-premium) 
• the London house owner who is moving to Manchester for five years, after which she expects to retire to the home counties.  She wants to buy in Manchester but fears prices in the South East may surge ahead of those in the NW.  She needs a 5-year basis swap on the SE-NW differential. 

There is in fact a UK property derivatives market but I've never heard of a retail punter using it for proper hedging or investment purposes (has anyone ?), suggesting that it's not sufficiently liquid.  Also, it doesn't yet offer the kind of instruments in (locational) basis I described above.
 
[History corner: just at the point it went bust, Enron was about to make a market in UK property indices, basis and all.  It was going to buy Canary Wharf as its anchor in the 'physical' market, as a prelude to offering paper.]


The beauty of property is that loads of people are willing  - only too willing - to take spec positions on both sides, which is what generates the liquidity and tight spreads needed by the hedgers.  Absence of such willingness is what did for the weather derivatives market, which has never really taken off as it was supposed to do.  The simple fact is, no serious punter really has a view on next summer's average temperatures.  

So - good on Shiller, and roll on the liquid property-values market.  And let's subject future property price ramps to the full rigour of the short-sellers.

ND

Mis-selling Derivatives ? Do Let's Grow Up

OK, first up there are laws about this stuff and no bank should be selling derivatives to any person or organisation deemed incapable of understanding them properly. Know your customer and all that. But an interest-rate collar to a commercial enterprise ? It's pretty simple stuff, despite Robert Peston's silly attempt to make it sound complicated.

An 'asymmetric cap and collar' ? Do us a favour, Pesto, it's a collar (or a cap and floor, same thing), and the asymmetry has nothing to do with the issue. The premium sounds ridiculously steep and it's that which raises the eyebrows, not the collar itself. But who knows what the credit-risk looked like for Barclays on the floor leg ? And how would a basic swap have been priced to the same customer at the same time ?

If Barclays have indeed screwed up on 'know your customer', the deal will be unenforceable anyway. So one presumes that technically speaking, they haven't.

Move along, nothing to see here.

ND

Greece, ISDA, Derivatives - and a Puzzle

So the ISDA committee pontificated on the Greek bond-swap, the smoke issued from the chimney and yes, habemus papam, we have a Credit Event.

This is interesting. The conspiracy theorists had predicted the committee would be swayed by substantial Wall Street influences to vote the other way - against all reasonable judgement - in order to avoid them having to pay out (mainly to European banks) on untold billions of CDS liabilities. You could see why they might: and the word was that an avalanche of systemic risk would otherwise be realised.

Well, t'committee jumped the right way and good on 'em. The whole purpose of ISDA is to have an internationally credible contractual basis for transacting derivatives. ISDA provides definitive guidance on contract language for drawing up forwards, swaps, options etc to ensure the transactions (a) achieve the desired commercial result and (b) are enforceable, which isn't always easy. The problems relating to the first part of this have largely been long-since solved; and for enforceability the usual solution is to have the contracts made subject to English or New York law (i.e. common law, none of your civil code nonsense). But bankruptcy and default will often perforce be subject to overriding local law, and in consequence most of ISDA's work over the past decade or more has related to 'credit support' issues. ISDA's credibility is absolutely vital.

Here's the puzzle. Far from this excellent decision resulting in meltdown,

"according to the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation’s CDS data warehouse, the total net exposure of market participants who have sold CDS credit protection on Greek sovereign debt is approximately $3.2bn as of March 2, 2012"

and the payout would of course be even less - i.e peanuts, relatively speaking. Do we believe this ? Time will tell.

Incidentally, when writing that ISDA's cred is vital I am conscious that some C@W readers consider derivatives to be the work of Old Nick. Well, take it from Young(er) Nick, this is badly misconceived. Example: without liquid forward markets in commodities there can be no effective & sustainable competitive markets in the physical commodities themselves, for reasons I could bore you with at length. Does anyone around here doubt we need competitive conditions in such markets ? I hope not.

And for effective forward markets, as with any derivatives, we need (inter alia) bankable contracts, and depth - which in turn requires speculative money at the table and plenty of it, as well as 'natural counterparts'. We must hope that things are as benign as they now seem, and that the hype around ISDA's Greek decision was as ill-informed as the Y2K nonsense.

ND