Part 1 was a qualitative summary of what the SZC deal looks like. It isn't difficult to find more exact details - Mr W has provided several links & AI will yield more - though history suggests almost anything with a £ sign or a timeline will necessarily be a wild guess. And even when apparently tied down contractually, EDF shamelessly just asks for more money / time whenever it feels like some, as the Hinkley Point experience amply demonstrates.
We now turn to the questions posed in Pt 1.
Why SZC's "identical design" won't cost less than HPC
We've heard this story before: HPC would be a doddle, because Flamanville and Olkiluoto had blazed the trail for the EPR design. But of course neither of those was remotely complete & commissioned before work started on HPC, so there was a distinct dearth of Lessons Learned from the outset. Also, both had started development before Fukushima, so there were always going to be new considerations to contend with. But EDF persisted with the "cookie-cutter = cost savings" promise: so now SZC will be even easier, even cheaper! Nowadays, of course, with HPC being a complete fiasco in project management terms, they blame it on the UK regulators moving the goalposts / Covid / inflation etc etc. Well, all those things to some degree[1]; but how about several outright, scandalous EDF failures along the way? To give but one example: they failed to make an adequate geological survey of the HPC site, and thus missed systemic faulting in the bedrock. Result: epic additional quantities of additional concrete being required for the foundations, and at least a year's delay. There are several more examples of this kind which EDF - & HMG - find it convenient not to mention. And it ain't gonna change: EDF is not remotely as competent an engineering concern as it ought to be, or as it claims, or as many would like to imagine.
The other important factor to register is that the challenges for nuke projects on this scale are, in detail, very heavily site-specific. It's not too much of an exaggeration to say that every big nuke is almost sui generis. It's absolutely clear, for anyone following SZC in detail over the years as I have, that the Sizewell site poses a load of different engineering challenges that need to be addressed piecemeal. And again, EDF has been doing this incompetently or, as many believe, deliberately skimpily so that it could keep down the early cost estimates and reveal the "unexpected problems" one by one over the years, thereby "excusing" the relentless increases in budget and timetable they'll drip-feed onto us. To give just a few examples, of which 2 & 4 are outrageous:
- HPC enjoys the benefit of an already-existing, conveniently close-at-hand dock for the import of very large items. Sizewell does not. SZB utilised a temporary jetty during construction: EDF has shilly-shallied about whether they need to do the same this time around.
- Access to fresh water (needed in large quantities both during construction and in routine ops thereafter) hasn't been a big issue at HPC. It's a massive issue in parched East Anglia, and the SZC plans approved by HMG (under the Tories) don't include a resolution of this issue. (The Planning Inspectorate declined to approve the plans accordingly, but were over-ridden.) We may be sure that whatever solution they come up with, it'll add significantly to the budget (or dumped onto general water bills!).
- Faulted or not, there was at least bedrock close to the surface at HPC. But just under half of the SZC footprint lies on a former marsh (a small river delta) with bedrock very far below surface level. The piles that will need to be sunk will be very extensive and costly.
- The coastline of Sufolk is subject to serious, constant, millennia-long erosion patterns - as eny fule kno. Right now there is a shifting sandbar directly offshore Sizewell which has been protecting it for several years. But it's on the move, and that protection won't last the 135 years (sic) that the site must cater for, such is the way decommissioning works for UK nukes [2]. So (a) the concrete platform on which SZC will be built, needs to be much higher than that of HPC: and likewise the sea wall. Additionally, (b) there is a really obvious possibility of sea encroachment inland, on the north flank of the site (the marshy side - that old river inlet): the RSPB which manages that land reckons it'll happen within 50 years at most. Experts have long told EDF they need an extension of the sea wall to the northern flank accordingly, as well as on the (east-facing) seaward side. But only the latter is in the approved plans and the publicly-announced cost estimates. Additionally, in the aforesaid 135-year timeframe, inundation of the whole area is inevitable, so a full operational plan is required for the contingency of the entire Sizewell site - SZA, B and C - operating in 'island' mode on its concrete plinth. Again, this isn't in any published plan. Diligent investigation by campaigners has recently revealed that EDF have known about this all along, and do in fact have unpublished "supplementary" plans for all of it. But of course none of this features in any public "budgeting" or cost projections.
- etc etc - I could go on.
What else does all this leave us with? Several things:
- As mentioned before, the government is clearly desperate (they know wind + solar + batteries won't suffice) which, coupled with the endless willingness to be bullied by the French[3], is a recipe for bad deals at the start of the piece and non-stop piss-taking by the French thereafter. It's exactly what's happened with HPC, is still continuing with HPC, and has been happening thus far with SZC. Why would it stop?
- Even if we reckon the SZC deals are struck and definitive now, think of the scope this cost-plus arrangement gives France to pass through, well, anything they think they can get away with onto the "Sizewell C" account! Accountants are good at providing "alternatives" when it comes to cost allocation ... Sizewell B costs; general EDF engineering charges; "management fees" (much beloved of all "related-party" arrangements when one player pulls all the strings). etc etc. Now EDF retains just 12.5% equity in SZC, so on any cost that would otherwise be for EDF's own account, but that its accountants reckon can be passed through the SZC books, EDF sees at least a seven-eighths reduction, or more: and that's if it's borne by the equity. To the extent it's passed through on the cost base or the appalling overrun indemnity scheme, it could be anywhere up to a 100% reduction. Moral hazard, or what?
- One last thing: surely, you may say, there are audit rights for HMG to stop any such hanky-panky taking place? Doubtless, this is true, in that the contracts presumably say so. But here's the thing: when the astronomically-subsidised Drax was caught (by the BBC!) playing silly buggers with its fuels reporting, and was forced to admit to Ofgem and DESNZ that it didn't have adequate data to account for everything it was self-certifying, it got a rap over the knuckles (£25m penalty) but nothing more. MPs clamoured for full audits to be conducted of everything before a penny more in subsidy was paid to Drax - we are talking billions, after all. But at the Select Committee hearing, both DESNZ and Ofgem stated clearly that they had no resources to check everything Drax tells them in its self-certified reporting on its complex fuel-sourcing operation.
What other reasons might there be for the charade?
There's a longstanding thesis, much peddled by the SPRU team at the U. of Sussex, that the unspoken motive for UK 'civil' nuclear policy is cross-subsidy for our military nuclear programmes. This once seemed more of a conspiracy theory than it does now: read this, from Kier Starmer just last week - his "strategic steer to the nuclear industry".
... Nuclear technology is vital to our country’s economic growth, energy security, and national defence. It delivers reliable, low-carbon electricity and supports our nuclear deterrent ... We are building on this legacy with clear commitments on the future of our nuclear deterrent, our submarine programmes, Sizewell C and the SMR programme.
Surely, the only intended readership for this bellicose Starmerite "strategic steer" is one V.V. Putin. I rather doubt L'il Volodya is quaking in his boots.
ND
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[1] As blanket excuses go, Covid is particularly open to challenge. Building works were never subject to lockdown, the reasoning being they are outdoors. I know a great deal about another large construction project which was comfortably able to speed up its project schedule and reduce its costs during Covid, when (a) various restrictions arising from the need to work around nearby sites of regular employment were lifted, because these other sites were now shut down; and (b) labour costs came down because many construction-related trades found that much of their regular work dried up. OK, maybe (a) doesn't apply so much in the middle of Somerset: I'm just saying "Covid" isn't a free pass on costs and schedules.
[2] The way we decommission nukes in the UK involves taking away some of the radioactive stuff upon cessation of ops, then sheathing and just turning the keys on the rest of the site, walking away, waiting for cooling down & the half-life effect (venting into the atmosphere, BTW) to reduce the radiation enough for final clearance. SZA is in that state right now; also HPA. 2160 is accepted by EDF as the relevant date for SZC. There's no chance the Suffolk coastline stays as it is for that long: and some extreme scenarios suggest 2190 would be the date.
[3] I mean, what else can they do to us? Take even more of our money and do even more nothing about the small boats - check. Be even more beastly to us over any attempt to engage in ordinary trade & diplomacy with the EU - check. What favours are we buying when we give them everything they ask for on HPC and SZC, with fat cheques included?
